# John Melcher, Honorable Member, United States Senate v. Federal Open Market Committee

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · December 18, 1987 · 836 F.2d 561

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477093

## Case

- **Full name:** John MELCHER, Honorable Member, United States Senate, Appellant v. FEDERAL OPEN MARKET COMMITTEE, Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** December 18, 1987
- **Citations:** 836 F.2d 561; 266 U.S. App. D.C. 397; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16439; 1987 WL 23568
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Edwards
- **Judges:** Edwards, Starr, Ginsburg
- **Cited by:** 30 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Chenoweth, Helen v. Clinton, William J., 181 F.3d 112 (1999).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477093

## Opinion text

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
The narrow question this case presents is whether the principle of equitable discretion we articulated in Riegle obliges us to refuse to reach the merits of Senator Melcher’s suit, notwithstanding the inability of some, perhaps all, private plaintiffs to raise his challenge following our decision in Committee for Monetary Reform. The answer is that those principles plainly do forbid our addressing Senator Melcher’s constitutional argument. Riegle held that dismissal of a legislator’s suit is appropriate “[wjhere a congressional plaintiff could obtain substantial relief from his fellow legislators through the enactment, repeal, or amendment of a statute.” 656 F.2d at 881. In that case, we found that Senator Riegle could obtain redress were he able to persuade his colleagues to alter the method by which the five Reserve Bank members of the FOMC are appointed. Senator Melcher is in exactly the same situation. We are therefore constrained to dismiss his suit.
The possibility that no one else could bring Senator Melcher’s constitutional challenge does not require us to depart from the result we reached in Riegle, despite stray dicta to the contrary in our opinion in that case. Cf. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 , 94 S.Ct. 2925, 2935 , 41 L.Ed.2d 706 (1974) (“The assumption that if respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to find standing.”). Upon reflection, it is no longer clear to me that equitable discretion is a viable doctrine upon which to determine the fate of constitutional litigation. Nonetheless, Riegle is the law of the circuit and it must be followed until rejected by this court en banc or the Supreme Court.
Because our holding in Riegle controls the resolution of this case, I see no reason to join the majority in speculating on the proper resolution of the alleged “tension” between “the vindication of meritorious claims grounded in the higher law of the Constitution” and the “role of the courts in a democratic society.” I particularly wish to distance myself from the majority’s sweeping claims about the mission of the federal courts in our constitutional system. These concluding dicta allude unnecessarily to monumental questions not before this *566 court. I therefore concur in the majority’s result, but not in its opinion. *
I join in the majority's disapproval of the suggestion in Riegle that the ability of a private plaintiff to bring a particular suit affects the propriety of our entertaining the same challenge when brought by a legislator. See Majority op. at 565 n. 3.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477093. Public record. Not legal advice.