# Sandra K. Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc. Chesapeake Developmental Unit, Inc. Chesapeake Group Homes, Inc.

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · December 10, 1987 · 835 F.2d 71

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477041

## Case

- **Full name:** Sandra K. BEATTY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHESAPEAKE CENTER, INC.; Chesapeake Developmental Unit, Inc.; Chesapeake Group Homes, Inc., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 10, 1987
- **Citations:** 835 F.2d 71; 10 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 223; 45 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 37,619; 45 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 806; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 16104; 1987 WL 21153
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Hall
- **Judges:** Winter, Russell, Widener, Hall, Phillips, Murnaghan, Sprouse, Ervin, Chapman, Wilkinson, Wilkins, Haynsworth
- **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Although it mandated great deference to a district court’s findings of fact, the Supreme Court in Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 , 105 S.Ct. 1504 , 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985), articulated a standard of appellate review, not a standard that precludes review. Even a decision that re *76 lies upon an assessment of witness credibility may be reversed as “clearly erroneous” when the witness’s account viewed “in light of the record in its entirety” is “implausible on its face.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 , 105 S.Ct. at 1512 . See also, Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781 (D.C.Cir.1986).
For the reasons previously stated in the majority opinion in Beatty v. Chesapeake Center, Inc., 818 F.2d 318 (4th Cir.1987), I remain convinced that the Chesapeake Center’s explanation for its prima facie act of employment discrimination was utterly unworthy of belief. The en banc majority’s contrary conclusion suggests the “conclu-sory” application of Rule 52(a) which Justice Powell cautioned against in his concurring opinion in Anderson . I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the decision which the en banc majority announces today.
I am authorized to state that Judge Sprouse joins in this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9477041. Public record. Not legal advice.