# United States v. James Marty Stafford

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · November 6, 1987 · 831 F.2d 1479

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476861

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. James Marty STAFFORD, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 6, 1987
- **Citations:** 831 F.2d 1479; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 14764
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Pregerson
- **Judges:** Pregerson, Nelson, Wiggins
- **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476861

## Opinion text

PREGERSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I do not join in the majority opinion because I do not agree that proof of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1510 (a) requires facts separate from those required for proof of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 . Therefore, I believe that appellant Stafford cannot be subject to two consecutive prison sentences.
*1486 Absent Congressional intent, express or implied, regarding separate punishment for overlapping federal crimes, we employ the rule of statutory construction announced in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Blockburger provides “where the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.” Id. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182 (emphasis added); see Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684 , 100 S.Ct. 1432 , 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980) (reversing the imposition of consecutive sentences for rape and felony murder when rape was the felony used to establish felony murder).
The majority concludes that section. 1510(a) and section 1952 are separate offenses for purposes of the Blockburger rule because violation of section 1510(a) requires “actual bribery,” Majority Opinion at 1482, while violation of section 1952 requires only movement in interstate commerce with intent to commit bribery and an overt act in furtherance of that intent. See Majority Opinion at 1480.
The majority’s assertion that violation of section 1510(a) requires an actual bribe cannot be sustained in light of the legislative history of that section. 1 Section 1510(a) provides:
(a) Whosoever willfully endeavors by means of bribery to obstruct, delay, or prevent the communication of information relating to a violation of any criminal statute of the United States by any person to a criminal investigator shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned for not more than five years, or both.
(Emphasis added.) Regarding the word “endeavors” the House of Representatives report on the law states:
Here “endeavor” means any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that this act is designed to prevent. The use of the word “endeavor” avoids the technical difficulties which would be involved by the use of the word “attempt.” Thus, where a person’s acts have not progressed far enough to amount to an attempt, under the act such acts would come within the scope of the word “endeavor” and thus be subject to punishment.
H.R.Rep. No. 658, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1760, 1762.
The assertion that violation of section 1510(a) requires an actual bribe is difficult to reconcile with the legislative statement that “ ‘endeavor’ means any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose this act is designed to prevent.” The actual bribe requirement can only be reconciled with this statement if bribery is read out of the “evil purpose” to which the House of Representatives report refers. If, as the wording of the statute suggests, the evil purpose is “bribery to obstruct, delay or prevent communication ...,” then any “effort or essay” toward commission of a bribe would be sufficient to constitute a violation of the section.
In addition, the majority’s actual bribe requirement cannot be reconciled with another legislative statement: “The use of the word ‘endeavor’ avoids the technical difficulties involved by the use of the word ‘attempt.’ Thus, where a person’s acts have not progressed far enough to amount to an attempt, under the act such acts would still come within the scope of the word ‘endeavor’____” Id. If an actual bribe is required for a violation of section 1510(a), then, to violate the statute at all, one must commit every overt act usually necessary to “obstruct, delay or prevent communication” by means of “bribery.” Therefore, if an actual bribe is required, there can be no meaningful difference be *1487 tween an “attempt” and an “endeavor” to perpetrate the evil the section was intended to prohibit. Therefore, the actual bribe requirement adopted by the majority cannot be reconciled with the clearly drawn distinction between “attempt” and “endeavor” which appears in the legislative history.
The conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history of section 1510(a) is unmistakable. That history indicates that section 1510(a) prohibits endeavors to bribe as well as overt acts of bribery. By committing the overt act with the intent to bribe required for violation of section 1952, appellant also “endeavor[ed] by means of bribery to obstruct ... communication of information” and thereby violated section 1510(a). Because establishing a violation of 1510(a) does not require proof of any fact not required for proof of a violation of section 1952, under Blockburger , appellant cannot be subject to two consecutive sentences.
. The majority contends that is is not necessary to look to the legislative history to discern the meaning of section 1510. However, our goal in construing any statute "is to ascertain congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will.” Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 , 95 S.Ct. 1893, 1898 , 44 L.Ed.2d 525 (1975); see also United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir.1986). Where, as here, the statutory language is unclear, we look to the legislative history. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 , 104 S.Ct. 1541, 1547 , 79 L.Ed.2d 891 (1984).

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476861. Public record. Not legal advice.