# Peners L. Griffin and Henry L. Dejerinett v. Richard L. Dugger, Etc.

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · September 23, 1987 · 823 F.2d 1476

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476457

## Case

- **Full name:** Peners L. GRIFFIN and Henry L. Dejerinett, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Etc., Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** September 23, 1987
- **Citations:** 823 F.2d 1476
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Hatchett
- **Judges:** Tjoflat, Hatchett, Eaton
- **Cited by:** 201 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Modified by William Duane Elledge v. Richard L. Dugger, 833 F.2d 250 (1987).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476457

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that “each claim must be analyzed separately, and a claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives rise to that claim.”
- stating that the “constitutional threshold [of standing] must be met before any consideration of the typicality of claims or commonality of issues required for procedural reasons by Fed.R.Civ.P. 23”
- holding that a court may address whether the plaintiff has representative capacity only after determining the issue of standing
- explaining that to assert a class claim, "at least one named plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives rise to that claim."

## Opinion text

HATCHETT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. The majority holds that Smith did not meet the second element of the single-filing rule. That rule states, “the individual claims of the filing and non-filing plaintiffs must have arisen out of similar discriminatory treatment in the same time frame.” Jackson, 678 F.2d at 1011-12 (emphasis added). One of Griffin’s claims in his EEOC complaint was that the FDOC discriminated against black job applicants. Non-filing intervenor Smith’s claim arose “out of similar discriminatory treatment,” because he alleges that the FDOC discriminated against him and other applicants through administration of a test with a discriminatory impact on blacks. The majority ignores the fact that Griffin raised the claim of discrimination against black applicants in his EEOC complaint.
The majority erroneously assumes that if Griffin lacks standing to raise the hiring claim in federal court, then his raising of that claim before the EEOC is somehow ineffective for purposes of the single filing rule. The majority's reasoning is based upon its failure to differentiate between the policy underlying the standing requirement in federal court and the policy underlying the single filing rule in an EEOC action. The policy underlying the standing requirement is to ensure that a party litigating an issue has a concrete stake in the outcome of the case, and is therefore motivated to vigorously litigate the issues. The policy underlying the EEOC filing requirement is to ensure “that the settlement of grievances be first attempted through the office of the EEOC....” Ezell v. Mobile Housing Board, 709 F.2d 1376, 1381 (11th Cir.1983); Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 398 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir.1968). The purpose underlying the EEOC filing requirement is therefore to promote the resolution of Title VII claims out of court. The EEOC proceeding is not designed as a way-station on the road to the federal courthouse.
By asserting a hiring grievance in his EEOC complaint, Griffin ensured “that the settlement of [hiring] grievances [would] be first attempted through the office of the EEOC.” Ezell, 709 F.2d at 1381 . The fact that Griffin may not have had standing in federal district court to raise the hiring issue is irrelevant to the fact that his EEOC complaint gave the EEOC an opportunity to settle the hiring grievance before that grievance was sued upon in federal district court. Since Smith’s claim in federal district court of discriminatory hiring practices is identical to the claim of discriminatory hiring practices asserted in Griffin’s complaint before the EEOC, invoking the single filing rule will not frustrate the purpose of the EEOC filing requirement: to give the EEOC a chance to resolve Title VII claims before they go to court. The fact that Griffin may not have had standing to raise the hiring claim in court is irrelevant to the issue of whether the EEOC has had a chance to resolve that claim before it is taken to court, whether by Griffin, Smith, or anyone else.
In short, the majority has grafted the constitutional standing requirement for parties litigating in federal district court onto the filing requirements for persons alleging Title VII claims before the EEOC. Such a requirement does not, and never has, existed. The majority, however, misinterprets Fifth Circuit dicta to reach just that conclusion. That dicta says, “Once an aggrieved person raises a particular issue with the EEOC which he has standing to raise, he may bring an action for himself and the class of persons similarly situated.” Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498 . The majority fails to mention that the sole issue in the Oatis case was whether a Title VII class action could include in the class persons who had not previously filed charges with the EEOC. The court held that the class could include such persons. The Oatis court gave its reasoning for this holding in the sentence immediately preceding the language relied upon by the majority in *1495 this case. That sentence states, “If it is impossible to reach a settlement with one discriminatee, what reason would there be to assume the next one would be successful.” Oatis, 398 F.2d at 498 . In short, the court in Oatis was not faced with the question of whether an EEOC complainant could effectively file claims with the EEOC even though the complainant would not have standing to assert the claim in federal district court. The majority’s application of constitutional standing requirements to the EEOC complainant puts the EEOC in the nonsensical position of having to anticipate how the federal district court will rule on the complainant’s standing to litigate various claims if the EEOC does not resolve them. Such a rule will result in the EEOC narrowing its resolution of claims to those which it anticipates the complainant will have standing to sue upon in federal district court, regardless of the apparent existence of the alleged discrimination with respect to other employees or job applicants. Such a situation would hardly further the purpose of the EEOC filing requirement: to resolve Title VII claims out of court.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) says:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that an employer ... has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of the charge ... and shall make an investigation thereof.
This provision requires the Comnpssion to investigate all charges which a person “claims” to be aggrieved of. In no way does the provision suggest that the Commission is limited to the investigation of claims which the complainant will have standing to bring in a federal court. Any suggestion in Oatis of such a requirement is dicta that is in conflict with the intent of the statute that the EEOC resolve “claimed” discrimination out of court. Smith should therefore be allowed to proceed in federal district court as a class representative for the class of applicants who failed the objective test.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476457. Public record. Not legal advice.