# Kathy Jo Taylor, a Minor, by and Through David S. Walker, Jr., Attorney at Law as Guardian Ad Litem v. James G. Ledbetter, ph.d.

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · June 9, 1987 · 818 F.2d 791

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476189

## Case

- **Full name:** Kathy Jo TAYLOR, a Minor, by and Through David S. WALKER, Jr., Attorney at Law as Guardian Ad Litem, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James G. LEDBETTER, PH.D., Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 9, 1987
- **Citations:** 818 F.2d 791; 55 U.S.L.W. 2681; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 7459
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Anderson
- **Judges:** Roney, Godbold, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Vance, Kravitch, Johnson, Hatchett, Anderson, Clark
- **Cited by:** 239 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476189

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that "a child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a section 1983 action [against the foster care agency] for violation…
- holding that the “such similarities exist between a prisoner’s situation and the situation of a minor forced into a foster home that we are justified in holding that the situations are sufficiently analogous to support a section 1983 action”
- stating that it is a Constitutional violation where one "exhibited deliberate indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty and their failure to perform the duty or act to ameliorate the risk of injury...."
- explaining that the state has an affirmative duty because foster children are "placed . . . in a custodial environment . . . [and] unable to seek alternative living arrangements"

## Opinion text

ANDERSON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in all of Judge Hatchett’s opinion for the majority, except his resolution of the procedural due process claim based on Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972). I agree with Judge Hatchett that the Georgia statutory scheme creates a liberty interest which would be protected by procedural due process. However, I conclude that plaintiff has not stated a viable procedural due process claim. Plaintiffs brief to the en banc court makes it clear that plaintiff is pursuing a substantive due process claim (which the majority opinion, following Doe v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.1981), finds to be viable in this case), and that plaintiff is not pursuing a procedural due process claim. In any event, for the reasons expressed by Judge Tjoflat in the last two paragraphs of Part III of his opinion, a predeprivation denial of procedural due process makes no sense in the context of this case. Any procedural due process claim based on a post-deprivation denial of due process would fail for failure to establish the inadequacy of Georgia’s general tort remedies. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981); Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451 (11th Cir.1985).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9476189. Public record. Not legal advice.