# United States v. Abraham Ceballos and Efrain Adames

> Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · February 13, 1987 · 812 F.2d 42

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9475858

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Abraham CEBALLOS and Efrain Adames, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- **Decided:** February 13, 1987
- **Citations:** 812 F.2d 42; 1987 U.S. App. LEXIS 2247
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Miner
- **Judges:** Feinberg, Newman, Miner
- **Cited by:** 105 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9475858

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that while the question of whether a reasonable person would believe his person was seized was “normally a question of law,” that the district court was still entitled to deference because its "determination in this case is inextricably intertwined with the credibility…
- stating that an illegal arrest occurred when the defendant was asked to accompany agents to a field office, the agents did not convey that he had a choice in the matter, and he was then placed “in a small, locked interview room” and questioned for several hours
- concluding that an arrest occurred where an agent came to the suspect’s workplace and made a “request” that the suspect come to the station “for questioning,” did not inform him that he could refuse, and denied the defendant’s request to take his own car
- finding that “the [consent] to search and the statements given were too closely connected in context and time ... to break the chain of illegality” when only a few minutes had elapsed
- holding that a consent to search, given a few minutes after an unlawful arrest, was “too closely connected in context and time to the illegal arrest to break the chain of illegality”

## Opinion text

MINER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part:
Since I do not agree with the conclusion that Mr. Adames’ incriminating statements were causally connected to an illegal arrest, I respectfully dissent from so much of the opinion as reverses the denial of his suppression motion and reverses his conviction.
The district court judge was required to determine, from the totality of the circumstances, “whether [Adames’] consent to accompany the agents was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied.” United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 , 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1879 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). After hearing the witnesses who testified on the issue of consent and observing their demeanor, the trial judge found that Adames’ consent to leave his place of employment with the agents was voluntary. Since that finding is supported by the record, we may not replace it with our view of the evidence. Id. It seems inconsistent to accept the factual testimony of Agents Powers and Cases and the “historical facts” found by Judge Goettel but reject the judge’s conclusions respecting voluntariness, when those conclusions reflect his evaluation of the testimony presented at the suppression hearing.
According to the evidence, the agents conveyed a sense of urgency to Adames when they visited him at his place of employment. What was urgent, however, was their need to speak to him, not their need for him to accompany them. In fact, the agents told Adames that they could wait until he got off work, and they later specifically advised him that he was not under arrest. Moreover, “the Secret Service agents testified that Adames left voluntarily and cooperated in what proved to *52 be a misplaced hope of clearing himself of suspicion.” Memorandum Decision of District Court at 7 (April 8, 1986). That testimony seems quite plausible in light of the fact that Adames led the agents to the paper and printing press in an effort to persuade them that he was going into the business of printing flyers and was using the paper for “practice.” It is also logical that the agents would treat Adames with great care to avoid any appearance of coercion or arrest when they first came to interview him. The investigation then was in its early stages, and the only “hard” information available to the investigators was the purchase of the special paper for cash by “Efrain” and the transportation of that paper in a truck registered to Adames’ employer. The voluntary cooperation of Adames, therefore, was essential.
There can be no seizure of a person within the meaning of the fourth amendment unless a reasonable person would believe that he is not free to leave. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. at 1878 . The evidence here supports Judge Goettel’s conclusion that there was no arrest until the agents took Adames to their field office after viewing the paper, press and ink. At this point, it was clear that Adames would have been restrained had he attempted to leave. There is no basis to disturb the determination that a reasonable person would have believed himself free to leave until that time. The question of custodial arrest generally is a factual one, and it seems wrong to me in this case to afford only a selective deference (i.e., “some deference,” majority opinion, ante, at 1512) to Judge Goettel’s conclusions.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9475858. Public record. Not legal advice.