# Meredith Coleman v. Nyal Frantz, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · January 30, 1985 · 754 F.2d 719

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9473134

## Case

- **Full name:** Meredith COLEMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nyal FRANTZ, Sheriff of Wells County, Indiana, Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** January 30, 1985
- **Citations:** 754 F.2d 719; 1985 U.S. App. LEXIS 29052
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cudahy
- **Judges:** Cudahy, Cummings, Gordon
- **Cited by:** 120 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Abrogated in part, on other grounds by William J. Benson v. Robert H. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (1986).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9473134

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “[a]n extended detention before a first appearance, whether or not there has been a valid determination of probable cause, substantially impinges upon and threatens” a plaintiff’s constitutional due process rights
- declining to apply discretionary/ministerial distinction to qualified immunity analysis but opining that “[i]t does seem reasonable, however, to require that a lower level public official such as a sheriff demonstrate that, based on objective circumstances at the time he acted…
- finding that Baker “supports, if not requires” the conclusion that the plaintiff’s eighteen-day detention without an appearance before a judge or magistrate was a deprivation of liberty without due process of law”
- concluding, after summary judgment, that 18-day detention without initial appearance violated plaintiff’s constitutional rights

## Opinion text

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I agree that Sheriff Frantz was, on the particular facts of this case, shielded by qualified immunity. The duty in question is the duty either to take the prisoner before a magistrate or to release him.
I disagree with the majority opinion in that I think that there was a clear duty— reasonably known to the Sheriff — to take Coleman promptly before the court. The only problem with this theory of liability is that the Sheriff apparently did all he could to fulfill this duty, but, without the support of a prosecutor and the acquiescence of a judicial officer, there was nothing he could do.
A much more plausible theory may be based on Frantz’s alternative duty to release the prisoner if he could not be brought before a judicial officer. Here, I disagree with the dissent: there was at the time no sufficiently clear and established duty, known to Frantz, to release the prisoner within 18 days if it was impossible to present him to a judge or magistrate. In light of the court’s decision today, of course, there should no longer be any doubt about this aspect of the duty.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9473134. Public record. Not legal advice.
