# Richard Bichler v. Union Bank and Trust Company of Grand Rapids > Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · October 30, 1984 · 745 F.2d 1006 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9472719 ## Case - **Full name:** Richard BICHLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNION BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF GRAND RAPIDS, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - **Decided:** October 30, 1984 - **Citations:** 745 F.2d 1006 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Jones - **Judges:** Lively, Edwards, Engel, Keith, Merritt, Martin, Jones, Contie, Krupansky, Wellford, Weick - **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9472719 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that Rule 56 applies even when a person’s mental state is at issue, a question reserved for the jury under state law - applying Rule 56 in a diversity case where the law of Michigan required issue of actor's mental state to be submitted to a jury - applying Michigan law and the qualified privilege to pre-elude right-of-privacy claim - applying Michigan law and the qualified privilege to preclude right-of-privacy claim ## Opinion text NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on the scope of Michigan’s qualified privilege for reporting on matters of public interest. There is no dispute that Michigan law provides such a privilege to the media when reporting on matters of public interest even when they involve stories about private individuals. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 82 Mich.App. 153 , 266 N.W.2d 693 (1978). When properly invoked, this privilege shields the media from liability for publishing private information about a private individual or placing a private individual in false light absent a showing of actual malice, ie., that the publication was made “with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Peisner, 82 Mich.App. at 163 , 266 N.W.2d at 698 . It is equally clear that this qualified privilege is not unlimited in scope such that the media may publish any information it so desires. Instead, a statement is privileged only to the extent that it is limited in its scope to the public issue addressed in the publication. Timmis v. Bennett, 352 Mich. 355, 369 , 89 N.W.2d 748, 755 (1958). The *1018 majority defines the scope of the privilege as extending to all statements which bear a reasonable relationship to the general privileged subject matter of the publication. The majority concludes that the statements about Bichler’s personal financial condition played an “integral part” in the development of the “central thesis” of the broadcast, i.e., the theater’s financial troubles. Supra, at 1012. Although this definition of the scope of Michigan’s qualified privilege may be preferred by the majority, our task in this case is not to define the scope of the privilege ourselves, but to ascertain how the Michigan Supreme Court would define the scope. See City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 386 (10th Cir. 1979). Granted this task is made more difficult by the apparent dearth of Michigan caselaw defining the limits of the privilege. As Judge Weick points out in his dissent, however, we are not unguided in our attempt. The right to withhold embarrassing private facts from public view and the right not to be placed in a false light are both encompassed within the constitutionally protected right to privacy. See Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411 , 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948). Defining the proper scope of Michigan’s qualified privilege requires a balancing between the individual’s right to privacy and the public’s need to know. Peisner, 82 Mich.App. at 161-63 , 266 N.W.2d at 697-98 . In Weeren v. Evening News Association, 379 Mich. 475 , 152 N.W.2d 676 (1967), the Michigan Court reversed a grant of summary judgment and remanded for trial on the plaintiff’s action for defamation and invasion of the right to privacy. While recognizing therein that an individual could waive his right to privacy, it was written that such waiver carries with it the right to an invasion of privacy only to such an extent as may be legitimately necessary and proper in dealing with the matter which has brought about the waiver. [The right to privacy] may be waived for one purpose, and still asserted for another... 379 Mich, at 502 , 152 N.W.2d 676 (Black, J.). It is clear that Bichler waived his right to privacy insofar as it relates to his management of the theater and any statements concerning the theater’s problems are appropriately shielded by Michigan’s qualified privilege. It is equally clear that Bichler has never done anything which could be construed as waiving his right to privacy concerning his personal financial affairs. Thus statements concerning Bichler’s personal finances are not shielded by the privilege and the district court erred in requiring him to prove that these statements were published with malice. Accordingly, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand for trial under the proper standard of liability. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9472719. Public record. Not legal advice.