# Arthur Quiller, Lillie Mae Quiller, and All Other Persons Similarly Situated v. Barclays American/credit, Inc.

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · May 22, 1984 · 727 F.2d 1067

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471790

## Case

- **Full name:** Arthur QUILLER, Lillie Mae Quiller, and All Other Persons Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BARCLAYS AMERICAN/CREDIT, INC., Defendant-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** May 22, 1984
- **Citations:** 727 F.2d 1067; 1984 U.S. App. LEXIS 22285
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Roney
- **Judges:** , Godbold, Kravitch, Roney
- **Cited by:** 148 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471790

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the *854 basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint
- stating that the decision to dismiss on Rule 12(b)(6) must be made on the basis of the allegations made on the face of the complaint
- recognizing that the affirmative defense of federal preemption can be the basis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
- recognizing that issue of preemption can be the basis of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion

## Opinion text

RONEY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding that the Quiller contract does not qualify for protection under the Federal Preemption Statute. I agree with the Court that the thirty-day notice provision is not required to be in the contract. I cannot agree that the remedy applied here is suitable because of the language in the contract concerning the notice requirement.
When the contract is obviously drawn and intended by all parties to permit them to take advantage of the Federal Preemption Statute, it is unduly harsh to throw the whole contract out just because it contains language which appears to violate the thirty-day notice requirement. Rather than applying state usery laws to a contract which could not have been validly made thereunder, it would be more equitable to simply invalidate this contract clause to the extent it violates the consumer regulations, and enjoin enforcement if that remedy is deemed necessary to protect the consumer.
This result would further the twin aims of the Federal Preemption Act, assuring the availability of consumer credit for the purchase of manufactured housing and according protection to consumer borrowers, without interfering so unnecessarily with a carefully conceived financing program established to meet the needs of both parties in a time of rising money cost.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471790. Public record. Not legal advice.