# United States v. Robert E. Tucker

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · September 30, 1983 · 716 F.2d 576

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471128

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert E. TUCKER, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** September 30, 1983
- **Citations:** 716 F.2d 576
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Ely
- **Judges:** Ely, Sneed, Alarcon
- **Cited by:** 108 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471128

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that some “defense away from that location in a strategies may be so ill-chosen that they deserted area, opened the m a y r e n d e r c o u n s e l ’ s o v e r al l trunk and [the victim] was representation constitutionally deficient”
- stating that the amount of client 25 communication required depends on factors such as the amount and complexity of the 26 evidence to be presented at trial
- holding that, in a complex fraud case, “it should have been obvious to a competent lawyer that the assistance of an accountant [was] necessary”
- holding that, in complex fraud case, “it should have been obvious to a competent lawyer that the assistance of an accountant [was] necessary.”
- stating that some “defense strategies may be so ill-chosen that they may render counsel’s overall representation constitutionally deficient”

## Opinion text

ELY, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Under the current law of our court and that of numerous other Courts of Appeals, I must concur in the opinion of my Brother Alarcon. His opinion reflects intensive study and remarkable scholarship. As I express my concurrence, however, I cannot resist the temptation to reiterate my deeply held conviction that ineffective representation by the attorney for an accused should be equated with lack of any representation whatsoever. I have no doubt that one tried for a criminal offense often fares very much worse, especially in a jury trial, if he is represented by incompetent counsel than he would fare if he had no attorney at all. This, I believe, is an undeniable truth. My belief is squarely based not only upon my own personal legal experience for almost fifty years, participating in hundreds of trials as a trial lawyer and subsequently reviewing countless records as a circuit judge for almost nineteen years. It is also founded upon experiences related to me by highly respectable attorneys and judges during my officerships in the Texas Junior Bar Association, the California State Bar, the Los Angeles County Bar Association, particularly during my presidency, and intimate associations arising from my membership in the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association and from my many years of fellowship in the American College of Trial Lawyers.
If my belief in the above respects is correct, and that belief has thus far been unalterable, then it should logically and fairly follow that when it is determined that an accused has been represented by a legally incompetent attorney, as is the case here, it should be presumed, without further inquiry and as a matter of law, that the accused has suffered such grievous prejudice as to entitle him forthwith to a new trial. Compare Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir.1978) (Hufstedler, Circuit Judge, joined by Ely and Hug, Circuit Judges, dissenting at 1334).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9471128. Public record. Not legal advice.