# New York State Association for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Hugh L. Carey, Individually and as Governor of the State of New York

> Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · June 15, 1983 · 711 F.2d 1136

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470872

## Case

- **Full name:** NEW YORK STATE ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED CHILDREN, INC., Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Hugh L. CAREY, Individually and as Governor of the State of New York, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- **Decided:** June 15, 1983
- **Citations:** 711 F.2d 1136; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26713
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wyzanski
- **Judges:** Friendly, Newman, Wyzanski
- **Cited by:** 1,081 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470872

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that all attorneys’ fees applications “for any work done after the date of this opinion should normally be disallowed unless accompanied by contemporaneous time records indicating, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done.”
- holding that attorneys who apply for court-ordered compensation must document the application with “contemporaneous time records,” which should specify, “for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done”
- holding that “the difficulties raised by the lack of contemporaneous records in this case convince us of the need to announce for the future that contemporaneous time records are a prerequisite for attorney’s fees in this Circuit.”
- holding that “[c]lontemporaneous time records are a prerequisite for attorney’s fees in this Circuit” and that such records “should specify, for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work done”
- recognizing that because “it is unrealistic to expect a trial judge to evaluate and rule on every entry in an application,” a specific percentage cut is “a practical means of trimming fat from a fee application.”

## Opinion text

WYZANSKI,
Senior District Judge, concurring:
My reasons for concurring in Judge Newman’s opinion require a brief statement.
Without qualification I agree with the substance and the form of Judge Newman’s opinion on all matters except the amount to be allowed to counsel per hour and the amount, if any, of a bonus factor. What I propose to deal with here concerns only those two exceptions.
Like Judge Friendly, sitting in this case as a senior judge, I feel more than usually bound by prior decisions of this Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Indeed, being a senior judge assigned from another circuit, I am particularly deferential to the views of my colleagues based upon precedents established in their own regular circuit.
Bound by the precedents of this Court of Appeals, I do not consider myself free to adopt what, at least tentatively, I believe to be the sound measure of compensation, i.e. one based on the following three elements: (1) the rate per hour which a private attorney of equivalent competence would reasonably charge to compensate him for his own personal services, plus (2) the fee-applicant’s own actual overhead (up to the point of but not beyond a reasonable amount), plus (3) an allowance (sometimes called a “bonus”) reflecting the fact that many cases of a similar type are handled by the applicant-attorney or his organization without yielding him or it any compensation whatsoever, or less than reasonable compensation. My own approach would reach parallel conclusions whether the applicant be an attorney in private practice, or in a public-interest law firm, or in a government office, or elsewhere.
Inasmuch as I do not feel free in this particular case to follow the foregoing formula, and I am aware that, if not satisfied with Judge Newman’s opinion, a party to this case may seek an en banc hearing of this case, and may file a petition for certio-rari on a basis like that which on May 31, 1983 led the Supreme Court of the United States to grant review in Blum v. Stenson, Sup.Ct. Oct. Term 1982, No. 81-1374, s.c. 512 F.Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d, 671 F.2d 493 (2d Cir.1981), I concur in Judge Newman’s opinion. However, in so doing, I look upon the $75 “break-point”, proposed by Judge Newman, as a mere ad hoc device for disposing of the case at bar. The $75 figure apparently comes from The Equal Access to Justice Act, which was designed to compensate defendants whom the government had sued without basis; it has no relation to appropriate compensation for attorneys serving in Civil Rights Act cases. Other circuits when dealing with Civil Rights Act awards have promulgated standards which impliedly permit an hourly allowance which in an appropriate case would exceed $75, e.g. National Association of Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1324-7 (D.C.Cir.1982).
In summary, I concur with Judge Newman principally because I believe that the most appropriate and soundest course is for me to do all I can to expedite consideration of this case by an en banc court of this circuit and, if needed, by the Supreme Court of the United States.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470872. Public record. Not legal advice.
