# Robert W. Boyle, of the Estate of Myra W. Boyle, Deceased, Plaintiff v. United States > Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · October 11, 1983 · 710 F.2d 1251 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470828 ## Case - **Full name:** Robert W. BOYLE, Executor of the Estate of Myra W. Boyle, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit - **Decided:** October 11, 1983 - **Citations:** 710 F.2d 1251 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Coffey - **Judges:** Posner, Coffey, Campbell - **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Red flag:** Reversed by United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241 (1985). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470828 ## Opinion text COFFEY, Circuit Judge, concurring. I agree with Judge Campbell’s well-reasoned opinion. I would like to make a few additional comments pertaining to our standard of review of the district court’s decision and the limitations imposed upon us by the doctrine of stare decisis. As noted in the majority opinion, this court’s Rohrabaugh v. United States, 611 F.2d 211 (7th Cir.1979), decision did not adopt a per se rule that reliance on counsel constitutes “reasonable cause” excusing the untimely filing of estate tax returns. Whether reasonable cause exists is, of course, primarily a question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact from all of the facts and circumstances in a particular case. Estate of DiRezza v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 19 (1982) (citing Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 200, 204 (1967), aff’d. per curiam, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.1979)). The burden of establishing that the failure to file a return was due to reasonable cause is upon the taxpayer. In the instant case, the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of the taxpayer after considering all the evidence before it. The limited record in this case consists of affidavits and depositions of Boyle and Keyser, his attorney. From my review of the record, I am convinced that the trial court properly determined that no material issues of fact existed concerning the background facts and circumstances and that this court’s Rohrabaugh decision was controlling. The dissent decrys our majority opinion herein as sanctioning “simple passivity” and rewarding Boyle for “simply clos[ing] his eyes and ears” and filing his return “whenever it pleased him.” However, as the majority opinion accurately outlines, there is substantial evidence in the record showing that Boyle did not blindly turn the administration of his mother’s estate over to Attorney Keyser or sit by passively as the due date passed. Boyle and his wife contacted Keyser numerous times (the affidavits and the depositions in the record repeatedly make mention of this fact), inquiring about the progress of the estate and, according to Attorney Keyser, Boyle was “repeatedly advised ... that [Keyser] would notify [Boyle] of the date on which [the estate tax return] must be filed and the tax therein paid.” During the months immediately preceding the filing of the tax return Boyle “had [his] wife call several times and [Key-ser’s firm] said they’d take care of it in plenty of time.” In fact, an inquiry by Boyle led to the estate tax return being filed within one week after Keyser and Boyle .realized it was tardy. These factors alone distinguish the instant case from each and every case cited in the dissent wherein: the taxpayers failed to make numerous inquiries as to the progress of the estate *1255 administration; neither were the taxpayers repeatedly advised by their counsel that the returns would be filed in “plenty of time”; nor did the taxpayers’ own inquiries trigger the immediate filing of the returns by the attorney after the due date was made known to the taxpayer: (1) United States v. Kroll, 547 F.2d 393 (7th Cir.1977) (involving a delay of over 9 months after knowledge of delinquency); (2) Estate of Lammerts v. Commissioner, 456 F.2d 681 (2d Cir.1972) (per curiam) (no evidence of any inquiry into progress of the estate); (3) Boeving v. United States, 650 F.2d 493 (8th Cir.1981), rev’g, 493 F.Supp. 665 (E.D.Mo.1980) (involving a delay of almost 7 months after the erroneously calculated due date); (4) Estate of Lillehei v. Commissioner, 638 F.2d 65 (8th Cir.1981) (per curiam) (no inquiries made); (5) Ferrando v. United States, 245 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1957) (no questions were asked of counsel); (6) Estate of Duttenhofer v. Commissioner, 410 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.1969) (per curiam), aff’g, 49 T.C. 200 (1967) (no inquiries made and constructive notice of actual due date); (7) Estate of Geraci v. Commissioner, 502 F.2d 1148 (6th Cir.1974), aff’g, 32 C.C.H.Tax Ct.Mem. 424 (1973) (no evidence of any inquiries and delay of almost one month after the erroneously calculated due date); and (8) Estate of Mayer v. Commissioner, 351 F.2d 617 (2d Cir.1965) (per curiam) (constructive notice of actual due date). I do not know what else a taxpayer can be expected to do when he retains a professionally trained tax counselor, makes repeated calls to check on the progress of the tax returns and is advised that everything will be taken care of in plenty of time. I understand and agree that courts should understandably be hesitant to impute the misdeeds of a lawyer to his client when the client is not personally negligent, as the facts in this particular case most eloquently recite. The dissent would require an executor/taxpayer to specifically ask his counsel the exact due date for each tax return in order to be considered as acting “reasonably.” No decision of this court, or any other circuit court, has ever held that asking a single magically worded question (the exact due date) is the determining factor in cases such as this. It is neither practical nor realistic to require a taxpayer to specifically inquire as to the exact filing date, to supervise his attorney’s every move, or to, in essence, personally perform those tasks he has entrusted his professionally retained legal counsel to complete. Questions concerning “reasonable cause” and “ordinary business care and prudence” must be resolved in this case in favor of the taxpayer after reviewing the totality of the circumstances, being cognizant of a client’s legitimate expectation that counsel will perform competently and professionally. Attorney Keyser was obligated, in accordance with Canon 6 of the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, to timely file the estate tax return and taxpayer Boyle reasonably and prudently trusted his counsel to perform responsibly. The dissent admits that Attorney Keyser’s active negligence was the primary cause of the late filing and the actions of Boyle, as outlined in the majority and herein, make it clear that the taxpayer was not even passively negligent (Boyle has paid and does not challenge an interest assessment of $1,326.56 which resulted from no fault of his own). The dissent intimates that Attorney Keyser fabricated his version of the interaction between himself and his client concerning the estate tax returns and therefore, according to the dissent, Keyser’s affidavit is of little or no probative value. Attorney Keyser swore to his affidavit under oath and I do not believe it is proper for this court or any court to either speculate or question one’s integrity without adequate proof. If Attorney Keyser has acted improperly at any time during his representation of Boyle, that is a matter to be considered by the Illinois Supreme Court, not a federal appellate court. If the author of the dissent seriously questions the integrity, honesty and motive of the attorney’s affidavit, a complaint should be filed with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois. An opinion of this court, even a dissent, should not cast aspersions on an attor *1256 ney on a skeletal record as we have in this case. The most valuable asset of an attorney is his/her reputation for honesty and integrity, which should not be castigated without adequate proof — much less nothing but speculation as we have in this case. Even if we accept the dissent’s argument that Rohrabaugh is in conflict with the law of other circuits, such a contention misses the point. When this court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, under the doctrine of stare decisis we must adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases, where the facts are substantially the same. As the majority opinion notes, the district court expressly cited Rohrabaugh in reaching its decision that Boyle’s failure to file was due to reasonable cause. Because Rohrabaugh is the law in this circuit, it is controlling in cases before this court which present substantially similar fact situations. It is our duty to apply the precedent of this court as it exists and it is improper to foist upon litigants our personal views of what the law should be. I fail to understand why the dissent is so interested in seeing that the innocent taxpayer is assessed a penalty for the late filing of the estate tax return due to the inefficiency, negligence, carelessness and misleading conduct of his tax counsel and see no reason for disturbing the decision of the district court, based on Rohrabaugh , which was supported by ample evidence. The taxpayer has already been forced to compensate the government by paying interest of $1,326.56 because the tax payment was approximately three months and a day overdue. The dissent broadly paints a picture of a sophisticated businessman crawling through a “tax loophole” in this case. Although Boyle is referred to as an engineer at a nuclear power plant, by his own testimony he is an “operating engineer,” a position requiring no advanced training but only a “union card.” There is absolutely no evidence in the record suggesting any intentional action by Boyle in an attempt to evade taxes or what was justly due the government. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470828. Public record. Not legal advice.