# Deborah Kent v. Richard S. Schweiker, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services

> Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit · June 22, 1983 · 710 F.2d 110

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470775

## Case

- **Full name:** Deborah KENT, Appellant, v. Richard S. SCHWEIKER, Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
- **Decided:** June 22, 1983
- **Citations:** 710 F.2d 110; 2 Soc. Serv. Rev. 229; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 26505
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Adams
- **Judges:** Adams, Weis, Becker
- **Cited by:** 1,063 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470775

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, in reference to the sub stantial evidence test, that “[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence.”
- stating, in reference to the substantial evidence test, that "[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence."
- explaining that substantial evidence standard is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication” and that it requires “qualitative exercise”
- explaining the substantial evidence standard is not “a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication,” rather, the standard requires a “qualitative exercise”
- holding that an ALJ’s own medical analysis which is contrary to medical evidence is invalid

## Opinion text

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
I agree that the order of the district court should be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings, although my reasons for this disposition differ from those of the majority.
The Secretary does not seem to have met his burden of showing that Kent has the capacity to perform sedentary work, but I am reluctant so to conclude without affording the Secretary an opportunity to explain with greater clarity the decision reached in this matter. The ALJ’s explanation of his disposition is obscure, and “[i]t would be improper for us to speculate as to [his] reasoning process.... ” Schaaf v. Mat *117 thews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir.1978). Out of an abundance of caution, therefore, I would vacate the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, rather than reverse. 1
. The Secretary may consider it appropriate to take additional evidence. This is a matter best left to the discretion of the Secretary. Cf. Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700 -707-08 (3d Cir. 1981).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470775. Public record. Not legal advice.