# H. Anita Lincoln, Cross-Appellant v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, and Clyde W. Hall and Evanel R. Terrell, Cross-Appellees > Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · February 10, 1983 · 697 F.2d 928 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470164 ## Case - **Full name:** H. Anita LINCOLN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA, and Clyde W. Hall and Evanel R. Terrell, Defendants-Appellants, Cross-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit - **Decided:** February 10, 1983 - **Citations:** 697 F.2d 928; 31 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,360; 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 22; 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30644 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Hatchett - **Judges:** Roney, Hatchett, Wisdom - **Cited by:** 214 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470164 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - noting that a clear error “standard of review imposes an especially heavy burden on the appellant ... [where] the evidence was largely testimonial, and the district court had the advantage of observing the witnesses and evaluating their credibility firsthand.” - rejecting claimed inconsistency between jury verdict exonerating individual defendants under § 1981 and district court’s finding that their principal was liable under Title VII because jury never considered principal’s liability - explaining that deference to the district court is not unlimited, and we will reverse a finding if the record lacks substantial evidence to support it - noting that “an especially heavy burden” rests on the appellant when the district court makes findings based largely on testimonial evidence ## Opinion text HATCHETT, Circuit Judge, dissenting: I dissent for two reasons: (1) the majority, in effect, overrules Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 , 82 S.Ct. 894 , 8 L.Ed.2d 44 (1962); and (2) the trial court and majority select as a discriminatory act one time-barred by statute, which ousts both courts of jurisdiction. The majority opinion finds liability against the Board of Regents following the theory advanced by the district court that Dr. Jackson, “whose liability the jury in the § 1981 action never considered, was in fact responsible for Dr. Lincoln’s departure from Savannah State.” On this theory, the majority emasculates the holding in Dairy Queen. Although the majority correctly recognizes that when legal and equitable actions are tried together, the right to a jury in the legal action encompasses the issues common to both, its holding provides a rationale by which the rule of Dairy Queen may be avoided. The rule announced today instructs plaintiffs in jointly instituted Title VII and § 1981 actions, that Dairy Queen may be avoided by simply failing to name one of the agent defendants in the § 1981 suit. If the agent defendant is not named in the § 1981 action, the trial judge is free to find facts as to the unnamed agent and thereby render the principal liable in the Title VII action. Additionally, under the majority’s holding, the principal may be found liable based on acts of the unnamed agent without any notice to the principal that the unnamed agent’s actions are suspect. The judge in this case was bound by the jury’s determination that no named agent of the Board of Regents was guilty of a discriminatory practice. Dr. Lincoln’s complaint names as party defendants the Board of Regents, Dr. Hall, Mrs. Terrell, and Ms. Wagner. Nowhere in the complaint was liability sought to be imposed on the Board for the acts of Dr. Jackson. In spite of this, the trial court and majority here impose liability on the Board on the basis of acts performed by an agent of the Board not named in the lawsuit and not defended at trial. This is precisely the sort of mischief Dairy Queen intended to curb. Moreover, if the discriminatory act that renders the Board liable is that of Dr. Jackson, then no jurisdiction existed in the district court. Title VII requires aggrieved persons to file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e). On April 1, 1977, Dr. Jackson notified Dr. Lincoln by memo that she was being terminated for cause. A formal letter to Dr. Lincoln on April 25, 1977, informed her of this course of action. On June 1, 1977, another letter from Dr. Jackson informed Dr. Lincoln of the reasons for her termination. Because the April 25, 1977, date is by law the date on which the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, Dr. Lincoln should have notified the EEOC by October 22, 1977, to come within the 180 day limitation. There is nothing in the record to indicate that an EEOC complaint was filed within 180 days of Dr. Jackson’s alleged discriminatory employment practice. A good reason exists for the absence in the record; no one, other than the judges in this case, ever considered Dr. Jackson’s actions as the acts giving rise to this lawsuit. „ --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9470164. Public record. Not legal advice.