# Dr. S. Simpson Gray v. Board of Higher Education, City of New York > Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · November 15, 1982 · 692 F.2d 901 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469916 ## Case - **Full name:** Dr. S. Simpson GRAY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION, CITY OF NEW YORK, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit - **Decided:** November 15, 1982 - **Citations:** 692 F.2d 901; 35 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 616; 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,162; 30 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 297; 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 24059 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Moore - **Judges:** Moore, Friendly, Oakes - **Cited by:** 59 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469916 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - reversing district court’s denial of discovery in part because “[t]he district court minimized the importance of appellants’ discovery needs in connection with” intent evidence and finding that “if unable to engage in discovery, [the plaintiff] cannot prove intent, and without… - recognizing academic privilege but holding plaintiff's need for information outweighed college's interest in confidentiality ## Opinion text LEONARD P. MOORE, Circuit Judge (concurring): I concur in Judge Oakes’ opinion to the extent that the opinion states “our decision today holds that- absent a statement of reasons, the balance tips towards discovery and away from recognition of privilege” and that such a statement will “permit the rejected probationer to remedy identified shortcomings, to correct erroneous information on which the peer review committee based its decision, as well as perhaps to realize that the decision resulted from institutional considerations unrelated to his or her competence.” In my opinion the statement should be that of the P & B committee rather than that of the two members thereof who, insofar as the record discloses, have not been authorized to speak for the committee. Both Magistrate Washington and Judge Pierce were mindful of the possibility of a protective order. Such an order might issue in the event that future developments in the depositions go beyond the spirit of Judge Oakes’ opinion, but it is not for the Court of Appeals to outline the course of future discovery. I only express the caveat that the federal courts not add the selection and promotion of college faculty to their already manifold problems. On Rehearing On petition for rehearing, the appellees argue that a presidential statement of reasons, note 9 supra, is sufficient (a) by virtue of the president’s participating and review *910 ing role in peer review proceedings and (b) by virtue of a gloss put on the collective bargaining agreement by arbitrators’ decisions that require the president to undertake an independent review of the decision of the peer review committee(s). The appellee thus argues that, contrary to the statement in footnote 9, the president may not “simply rely” and will not “usually be relying, solely on the faculty committee’s decision.” We continue to disagree with argument (a). We demur as to argument (b). Without foreclosing the appellees from making argument (b) in subsequent cases, we note that in any event no presidential statement of reasons was made here, and no committee statement was made or required by the collective bargaining contract. Courts weighing the proper scope of compelled disclosure in a civil rights action are not constrained, of course, by a collective bargaining agreement. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469916. Public record. Not legal advice.