# United States v. Thomas Richard Warner, Michael Charles Ward

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · November 17, 1982 · 690 F.2d 545

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469790

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Thomas Richard WARNER, Michael Charles Ward, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 17, 1982
- **Citations:** 690 F.2d 545
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Swygert
- **Judges:** Kennedy, Brown, Swygert
- **Cited by:** 194 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469790

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting a severance claim where the prosecution charged a single conspiracy, the evidence "was fairly straightforward and was unlikely to confuse the jury," and "[t]he jury's verdict show[ed] that it followed the[] [jury] instructions, making an individualized determination"…
- noting that the jury’s verdict acquitting defendant of the substantive count and convicting co-defendant of a lesser included offense demonstrated that the jury followed the court’s instructions to make individualized determinations of each defendant’s guilt as to each count
- holding that the fact that each member of a conspiracy did not know all the members or know of all the activities did not create multiple conspiracies

## Opinion text

SWYGERT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent.
I
In my judgment the record unequivocally shows that multiple conspiracies were *556 proved instead of the single conspiracy as charged. Thus, a fatal variance between the indictment and the proof requires reversal of Warner’s conviction on the conspiracy charge. The following scheme illustrates the point.
II
The Holland-Traverse City drug sales started in the spring of 1978 and ended in June 1978. The Kalamazoo sales started in July 1978 and ended in September 1978. The Government produced no evidence that Warner participated in the Holland-Traverse City operation or was aware of it. The Government’s evidence against Ward had the same insufficiency with respect to his involvement in the Kalamazoo operation. Each operation was a separate, independent operation conducted at different times and in different places.
McCarthy, of course, was the central figure in both operations, but the sine qua non of a conspiracy, an agreement, was lacking between the McCarthy/Schrock/Ward group and the McCarthy/Dick/Mead/Warner group. The lower side of the triangle is missing.
The Government relies heavily on one isolated transaction to show a cross connection between the two groups. According to McCarthy, who testified as a Government witness after entering a plea bargain agreement, Mead obtained two ounces of cocaine from Warner and delivered it to Schrock. Schrock sold it to McCarthy. McCarthy ultimately sold the cocaine to Cobb, and Cobb wired part of the purchase price directly to Mead. McCarthy further testified that he thought he was selling the two ounces of cocaine to Schrock for Schrock’s personal consumption. Mead, who also became a Government witness after plea bargaining, testified that he did not know why he received the money from Cobb or how Cobb participated in the transaction. Contrary to the majority’s view, I believe this isolated incident was insufficient to show a conspiratorial agreement between the two groups.
When a single conspiracy is charged, “the general test is whether there was one overall agreement to perform various functions to achieve the objective of the conspiracy.” United States v. Zemek, 684 F.2d 1159, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1980). That test was not met here. The two groups were separated by time and method. There was no interchange or interdependence between the suppliers Warner and Ward. The Government argues and the majority agrees that an overall agreement was shown because the “two groups of dealers were dependent upon one another for their success. . . . ” (Maj. op. at 550.) The majority treats the two groups as one large business venture. What really exists is two competitors. Using a hypothetical, simply because Sears, Roebuck & Company and Montgomery Ward both sell the same customer a television set at different times does not make them part of a single enterprise. Likewise, simply because Ward and Warner through separate chains of distribution both sold cocaine to McCarthy does not make them part of a single enterprise. I suspect the majority’s willingness to lump these competitors together is engendered in part by the illicit nature of the commodity they trade.
Given the lack of an overall single conspiracy, Warner’s conviction on the three *557 substantive counts with which he was charged should be vacated. There is no question in my mind that the “spillover” effect of the evidence not directly aimed at the substantive charges was so prejudicial to Warner that harmless error should not be used to affirm the convictions on these charges. A massive amount of evidence relating to other defendants and participants in other drug operations was received and would not have been admitted absent the conspiracy charge. The Kotteakos effect cannot be denied. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1944).
Ill
Michael Ward was indicted for distributing one gram of cocaine (Count 5) and conspiracy to possess and distribute cocaine (Count 23). The jury convicted Ward on both counts. Subsequently the trial judge vacated Ward’s guilty verdict on the conspiracy count. On the substantive count, the judge sentenced Ward to ten years’ imprisonment. The question before us is whether the guilty verdict on the substantive count can stand in light of the dismissal of the conspiracy count against Ward.
I recite the direct evidence against Ward on the substantive count. On May 24 or May 25, 1978 Willette, in the company of Schrock and McCarthy, went to a hotel room in the Valley Inn in Kalamazoo, Michigan. He was shown cocaine and a large sum of money. He described Ward’s briefcase as containing about sixty vials of cocaine and a quantity of $50 and $100 bills. He thought the cocaine was good quality. They used the cocaine at that time and Willette described the experience as one of numbness and lethargy and a feeling of well-being. The three men each purchased a gram and shortly thereafter used their purchase. Willette had previously testified before the grand jury that the man he had bought the gram from was known to him as “M.W.” During the trial Willette admitted lying to the grand jury. McCarthy, after testifying to the promises made for his testimony, testified that he bought one gram. He stated that Ward had a pound of cocaine, but that he saw no money and that he had earlier characterized Willette as a “habitual liar.”
The direct evidence against Ward is not very strong. No cocaine was ever introduced into evidence and the credibility of the witnesses who testified against him was subject to doubt. Willette was a confessed liar and both Willette and McCarthy testified after making deals with the Government. Further, their testimony conflicted over the simple observation of whether a briefcase contained a large sum of money. Given this weak evidence, it is inconceivable that the jury, despite a limiting cautionary instruction, was not influenced by the massive amount of evidence on the conspiracy charge. I believe the testimony concerning cocaine dealing among Cobb, Willette, Schrock, and McCarthy and among McCarthy, Mead, Dick, and Warner created a “spillover” which required the trial judge to effect a “retroactive” severance and grant a new trial to Ward. Harmless error has no place in this case. As with Warner, the Kotteakos effect cannot be denied. My reading of Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511 , 80 S.Ct. 945 , 4 L.Ed.2d 921 (1950), does not compel a different result. The following language by Justice Clark is critical:
It appears that not only was no prejudice shown, but both the trial court and the Court of Appeals affirmatively found that none was present. We cannot say to the contrary on this record. Nor can we fashion a hard-and-fast formula that, when a conspiracy count fails, joinder is error as a matter of law. We do emphasize, however, that, in such a situation, the trial judge has a continuing duty at all stages of the trial to grant a severance if prejudice does appear.
I believe that on the facts of this case, prejudice has been shown.
In summary, I would reverse Ward’s conviction on Count 5 and remand for a new trial. I would also reverse Warner’s conviction and remand for a new trial on the substantive counts.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469790. Public record. Not legal advice.
