# Anja Engineering Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · August 24, 1982 · 685 F.2d 292

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469553

## Case

- **Full name:** ANJA ENGINEERING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, Respondent
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** August 24, 1982
- **Citations:** 685 F.2d 292; 111 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2089; 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 16379
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Ferguson
- **Judges:** Anderson, Crocker, Ferguson
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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## Opinion text

FERGUSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion.
The majority decision represents a significant and ill-advised break with the deference we have always given “to the reasonable derivative inferences drawn by the Board from credited evidence.” NLRB v. Big Bear Supermarket No. 3, 640 F.2d 924 (1980). The standard of giving deference to the Board’s inferences is based upon recognition of the Board’s expertise in the field of labor relations. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 1977). See also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 , 71 S.Ct. 456, 464 , 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). The standard of review we have always applied when assessing the legitimacy of the Board’s inferences is that we will uphold the Board’s conclusions if they are supported by substantial evidence. Los Angeles Marine Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 1302 , 1305 (9th Cir. 1979). “This standard of review does not change merely because the Board reaches a conclusion contrary to that of the ALJ.” NLRB v. Warren L. Rose Castings, Inc., 587 F.2d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir. 1978). Obviously, we do not approve the Board’s findings if they are only based on speculation. Substantial evidence means that there must be a solid basis for the Board’s conclusions. But we should not lightly discard or disregard the Board’s view of the facts of a labor dispute in favor of our own view of those facts. The Board is able to draw on its rich experience with innumerable labor disputes in forming its view of a single case. We are able to draw on only a much more limited experience.
Doug Hartley, Inc. v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1982), the case on which the majority relies, is one in which the Board clearly overstepped its boundaries. In Hartley, the employees who were fired did not demonstrate even the minimal level of competence needed for the job. As the majority in Hartley points out, nothing in the NLRA has been or should be interpreted to prevent an employer from firing an incompetent employee. See L’Eggs Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 619 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1980). Moreover, in Hartley, the firings did not take place in the midst of militant union activity.
In the case before us, on the other hand, the plant had been the target of continuing *298 union activity. The fired employee, Betty Hoffman, was openly involved in union activity from the time the union first came on the scene. The Board concluded that given Hoffman’s open participation in union activities, and the company’s admission that they knew she was involved in the 1977 organizing effort, it was reasonable to assume “a continuing knowledge” of Hoffman’s union activities.
Likewise, the Board concluded that the timing of Hoffman’s termination immediately before a union election — and the fact that Anja had militantly fought the union’s efforts — made it likely that the termination was the result of Hoffman’s union activity.
The ALJ rests his contrary decision on the testimony of Anja Vice President Moore, who stated that he did not know that Hoffman was a continuing activist and that the firing was nothing more than a routine termination in accordance with a well-established company rule. The majority does not deny that the Board is not compelled to accept at face value the testimony of an employer concerning his motivation. NLRB v. Warren Rose Castings, Inc., supra, 587 F.2d at 1008 . Nevertheless, the majority rejects the Board’s assessment of the situation at Anja as “cynical.” While I can sympathize with the feeling that the Board’s view of this case is cynical, I can just as easily imagine the majority’s view being characterized as “benighted.” Is the Board too cynical — or is the majority not cynical enough?
We should be careful to remember that the determination of what is “true” in the field of labor relations demands a careful judgment of a complex reality. The NLRA established a specialized administrative body to make that kind of careful evaluation. Our past deference to the Board has institutionalized the common-sense wisdom that those who have developed an expert knowledge in the area are the ones capable of making the most accurate assessment of the facts. Those of us who are far removed from the storm and stress of a militant union campaign should be extremely cautious in our assertions about the reality of labor-management relations.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469553. Public record. Not legal advice.