# United States v. Nelson Bell

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · June 1, 1982 · 678 F.2d 547

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469200

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Nelson BELL, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 1, 1982
- **Citations:** 678 F.2d 547; 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18818
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Anderson
- **Judges:** III, Roney, God-Bold, Godbold, Ro-Ney, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay, Vance, Kravitch, Johnson, Henderson, Hatchett, Anderson, Clark
- **Cited by:** 759 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469200

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that a jury need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, and noting that circumstantial evidence is not intrinsically different from testimonial evidence

## Opinion text

*550 R. LANIER ANDERSON, III, Circuit Judge, joined by RONEY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur in the opinion, and I write separately only to state my understanding that Judge Vance’s opinion does not change the substantive law of this circuit with respect to the standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence. To say that the evidence is sufficient if “a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,” supra at 549, is not substantively different from saying that the evidence is sufficient if a reasonable trier of fact could find that the “evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” United States v. Marx, 635 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1981). It is true that “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt,” supra at 549, but it is equally true that if a hypothesis of innocence is sufficiently reasonable and sufficiently strong, then a reasonable trier of fact must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt about guilt.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9469200. Public record. Not legal advice.