# The Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Raymond Rowe, Sheriff of Imperial County > Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · February 2, 1976 · 531 F.2d 408 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462539 ## Case - **Full name:** The QUECHAN TRIBE OF INDIANS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raymond ROWE, Sheriff of Imperial County, Et Al., Defendants-Appellants - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - **Decided:** February 2, 1976 - **Citations:** 531 F.2d 408; 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 13046 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wallace - **Judges:** Chambers, Wallace, East - **Cited by:** 50 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462539 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - declining to rule on whether the tribe has inherent power to assert criminal jurisdiction *1467 over nonmembers because tribal constitution permits criminal jurisdiction only over members - declining to rule on whether the tribe has inherent power to assert criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers because tribal constitution permits criminal jurisdiction only over members - recognizing tribal power to restrict access to reservation and arrest powers ## Opinion text WALLACE, Circuit Judge (concurring): I concur with the result reached by the majority but reach it by a different path. *412 Buker was an officer of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and had the authority and responsibility to enforce federal and tribal laws pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1165 . That authority extended to non-Indians and clothed him with the legal power to prevent non-Indians from hunting on the reservation without consent of the tribe. The three youths did not have the tribe’s consent, which is granted only with the purchase of a tribal permit. Buker could have reasonably concluded that they came on to the reservation to hunt. The tribe’s dove season was open; the youths had at least one gun that could have been used for dove hunting; and Buker had heard shots coming from the area where the youths had been. As Buker had authority over the non-Indians, we do not need to decide whether he had actual authority to take the boys’ guns. All we need to conclude is that he was acting in good faith to enforce a federal law which he had authority to enforce. It is undisputed that Buker was acting in good faith. If his alleged criminal act was done in good faith pursuant to a duty imposed upon him by federal law, he is immune from state criminal prosecution. See Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51, 56-57 , 41 S.Ct. 16 , 65 L.Ed. 126 (1920); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 75 , 10 S.Ct. 658 , 34 L.Ed. 55 (1890); In re McShane, 235 F.Supp. 262 (N.D.Miss. 1964). Cf. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 , 87 S.Ct. 1213 , 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). It is true that the subjective good faith of an officer would not be sufficient to immunize him from criminal prosecution if his conduct was so outrageous that a reasonable officer could not conclude that it was within the scope of his authority or that his actions were reasonably required by the situation. But Buker’s action in taking the guns was not so outrageous as to be clearly beyond the scope of his authority. The incident occurred just before dark. The youths were obviously angered by his stopping them. He could have reasonably concluded that his action was necessary to protect the residents of the reservation. He testified that his main concern in taking the guns was to protect the reservation residents since it was getting dark. As Buker was immune from state criminal prosecution, it follows that the sheriff was without authority to arrest him and that the district court’s judgment of declaratory relief was correct. Therefore, I do not believe it is necessary for us to decide whether the tribe and its courts have jurisdiction over these young men. I hesitate to do so for two reasons. First, I have serious questions as to the legal theory adopted by the majority. Second, the question of whether the tribe has jurisdiction over non-Indians was not raised before the district court and I would prefer the question to be fully ventilated before we decide it. See Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Weigel, 426 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1970); Inman-Poulsen Lumber Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 219 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1955). The resolution of what authority a tribe has over non-Indians has serious consequences and is an issue upon which there is a diversity of opinions. The developmental process before the district court would provide us with a better foundation upon which to make our decision. As there exists an alternative ground, as I point out above, to sustain the judgment of the district court, there will be no miscarriage of justice and, therefore, I do not believe we are justified in deciding the issue. See Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-57 , 61 S.Ct. 719 , 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462539. Public record. Not legal advice.