# Henry Lee Bryan v. Clarence Jones, Sheriff, Henry Wade, District Attorney, Fidelity & Deposit Co.& Lena Giddens

> Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · April 30, 1976 · 530 F.2d 1210

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462506

## Case

- **Full name:** Henry Lee BRYAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Clarence JONES, Sheriff, Henry Wade, District Attorney, Fidelity & Deposit Co. & Lena Giddens, Defendants-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
- **Decided:** April 30, 1976
- **Citations:** 530 F.2d 1210; 1976 U.S. App. LEXIS 11537
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Wisdom
- **Judges:** Gewin, Thornber-Ry, Gee, Wisdom, Clark, Goldberg, God-Bold, Brown, Bell, Thornberry, Coleman, Ainsworth, Godbold, Dyer, Morgan, Roney, Tjoflat
- **Cited by:** 78 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462506

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that subsequent decisions “cast considerable doubt on the wisdom or continued vitality of [Whirl].”

## Opinion text

WISDOM, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I am in substantial agreement with the part of the Court’s opinion that ap *1218 plies the Supreme Court’s teachings in Scheuer v. Rhodes and Wood v. Strickland to the issue of a sheriff’s immunity for false imprisonment of a § 1983 plaintiff. The “reasonable good faith” defense was set up in a context of discretionary actions of state officials. Here, the defendant Jones plays a much greater ministerial role. The same defense is available to him, however, because it is basically unfair, as Scheuer pointed out, to subject a state official to liability when that official acts reasonably and in good faith. Whirl v. Kern had held that a sheriff could be liable even if he was not negligent. To that extent, Whirl is modified or overruled by the Court’s decision here.
I disagree, however, with part of the Court’s opinion and with the result. The last paragraph of the Court’s opinion goes much further than is necessary or wise. The Court appears to be attempting to define reasonableness in the context of a sheriff and the individuals in his custody. This attempt is an invitation to trouble. The most significant problem arises in the statement, “But if the errors take place outside of his realm of responsibility, he cannot be found liable because he has acted reasonably and in good faith”. This implies that Jones could not be found liable in a new trial, because the error, the preparation of the grand jury report, took place “outside of his realm of responsibility”. The question is not, however, where the error took place. The question is whether Jones was negligent in failing to discover the error. If that is not the question, it would be pointless to remand for a new trial on liability. In addition, the Court’s statement that the sheriff could be held liable for negligently establishing a record-keeping system should not be interpreted as limiting liability to such negligence. Any negligence proximately causing the illegal detention of an individual would suffice.
I disagree with the result of the Court insofar as it remands for a new trial on liability. Instead, I would affirm the finding of liability in view of the jury’s verdict that Sheriff Jones failed “to make a reasonable and timely investigation into the legal authority to imprison [the plaintiff] Bryan after March 3, 1972”. Although the trial court did not give the requested instruction on the reasonable good faith defense, and the Court now holds that such an instruction would have been a correct statement of law, it is not necessary to give the defendant another chance at the jury. A jury has found that Jones acted unreasonably. In light of this finding the appellant cannot argue that he was prejudiced by the court’s failure to give his proposed instruction. Had the requested instruction been given and had the jury acted consistently with its special verdict, the jury would have found that Jones did not act in “reasonable good faith”.
To be sure, there is no explicit instruction as to the meaning of “reasonableness”. But reasonableness is basically a jury question; it is a concept that loses meaning when courts try to pin it down. In any event, the jury was instructed that the sheriff’s “duty [was] not breached at the moment the prisoner should have been released”, that the sheriff “must employ means which are reasonably calculated to discover the legal authority if any to imprison a person”, and that the sheriff’s duty “cannot be delegated to deputies or to anyone else”. No issue has been taken with these instructions. Moreover, Jones’s counsel, in his closing argument, stated that the sheriff’s duty was not breached until “a reasonable time elapses to give [him] an opportunity to . make a reasonable investigation”, contended that it was reasonable for Jones to rely on the grand jury report, and urged that Jones could not have checked with the justices of the peace each of the 111 people booked into the jail daily.
In light of the instructions actually given, the arguments of Jones’s counsel, and, most importantly, the special verdict, Jones was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give the correct instruction. We have, in other cases, relied upon findings by the jury in holding that an erroneous instruction did not *1219 constitute reversible error. See Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Sides, 5 Cir. 1963, 320 F.2d 437, 444 ; cf. Marlowe v. Garden Services, Inc., 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 473 . See also Campbell v. Barnett, 10 Cir. 1965, 351 F.2d 342 ; Pickering v. Daniel J. Keating Co., 3 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 820, 823 . Bryan v. Jones fits into this category of cases. The defendant stated a correct proposition of law. The jury, however, found the facts against him, and that finding was not prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to give the correct instruction. The Court’s decision, then, to remand for a new trial on liability constitutes a decision to reject a jury verdict fully supported by the evidence.
I concur in most of the Court’s analysis of the law, but I respectfully dissent as to the result.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9462506. Public record. Not legal advice.