# Robert W. Kelley and Henry C. Maxwell, Jr. v. Metropolitan County Board of Education of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · December 18, 1970 · 436 F.2d 856

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9456407

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert W. KELLEY Et Al. and Henry C. Maxwell, Jr., Et Al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. METROPOLITAN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** December 18, 1970
- **Citations:** 436 F.2d 856; 1970 U.S. App. LEXIS 5904
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Celebrezze
- **Judges:** Edwards, Celebrezze, McCree
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9456407

## Opinion text

CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur with the majority holding that this Court may review an order of a District Court which has the effect of staying pupil integration proceedings for an indefinite time. Further, I am appalled by the fact that since these suits were first brought to the attention of the judicial system, a whole generation of school children has gone through a school system which has been determined vio-lative of their constitutional rights. And from a reading of the District Court’s opinion, it is equally clear that Judge Miller also does not sanction any School Board policy which “does not facilitate rapid conversion from a dual to a unitary school system.” Indeed, the District Court’s stay in this case must be read in the context of its legal conclusions that the Appellee School Board must “take affirmative action to maximize integration in all feasible ways so as to promote the immediate establishment of a unitary system.”
I depart from the majority decision in that I would not disturb the District Court’s temporary stay pending the resolution of cases involving the same issues which are presently before the United States Supreme Court. Ordinarily, it is within the discretion of a federal court to delay the implementation of its judgments where a decision is to be handed down from a higher court which may affect the outcome of a pending case. Such discretionary power is analogous to the District Court’s power to stay execution of a judgment pending an appeal. See Rule 62, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the instant case, the District Court had before it the proposed plan of the School Board when it issued its temporary stay pending certain decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The District Court had expressed itself clearly on the current policy of the School Board and we can only infer that its subsequent stay was based on the District Court’s belief that a final resolution of pupil integration would most rapidly be achieved by not enforcing the proposed School' Board plan. Instead, the District Court chose to await decisions by the United States Supreme Court on a group of cases about which the majority concede they “are profoundly aware of the[ir] potential impact.” In the absence of clear abuse, I would not disturb the District Court’s exercise of its broad discretionary power to determine when a temporary stay is appropriate.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9456407. Public record. Not legal advice.