# John Marshall v. Grant Sawyer, as Governor of the State of Nevada

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 7, 1962 · 301 F.2d 639

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9448472

## Case

- **Full name:** John MARSHALL, Appellant, v. Grant SAWYER, as Governor of the State of Nevada, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** March 7, 1962
- **Citations:** 301 F.2d 639; 5 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 73; 1962 U.S. App. LEXIS 5746
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Pope
- **Judges:** Pope, Hamley, Koelsch
- **Cited by:** 137 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9448472

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that orders dismissing complaints without dismissing the entire action are not appealable unless it is clear that no amendment to the complaint could possibly save the action
- discussing the known hazards of gambling that led to strict controls in Nevada

## Opinion text

POPE, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
Notwithstanding I am of the view that the complaint here fails to state a claim, I agree that the case should be remanded for trial and at such trial the facts developed and findings made. In my opinion the issues here are of such vital importance that the principles of sound judicial administration expounded in Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256 , 68 S.Ct. 1031 , 92 L.Ed. 1347 , 1 and Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Co., U.S., 82 S.Ct. 486 (Feb. 19, 1962), require that such issues should not be resolved upon a record so limited as this one is. If I were to *648 base a final judgment upon the complaint alone, read in the light of what I know judicially about the State of Nevada, and its laws, regulations and customs relating to its gambling business, I would be obliged to say that plaintiff is entitled to no relief. But I think the validity of my judgment on that matter can best be tested after all the evidence is in.
Plaintiff is not seeking to defend or enforce any of the commonly recognized rights for the protection of which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed. Involved here is not a right to use the highways as in Morf v. Ingels, D.C., (three-judge case, Cal.) 14 F.Supp. 922 , aff. 300 U.S. 290 , 57 S.Ct. 439 , 81 L.Ed. 653 ; or public transportation facilities as in Baldwin v. Morgan, 5 Cir., 251 F.2d 780 ; 5 Cir., 287 F.2d 750 ; or to hold a job, as in Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 , 36 S.Ct. 7 , 60 L.Ed. 131 . What this plaintiff asserts is that he cannot be excluded from a gambling establishment. Making such a claim discloses a failure to appreciate the nature and character of Nevada’s peculiar institution, — its legalized gambling.
True the gambling casinos are operated by individuals or corporations under state license, but in a very real sense, and in essence, the State of Nevada itself is in the gambling business, and its continued maintenance of that institution is vital to the State’s life and its economy. The people of that State could hardly contemplate its loss; indeed there have been indications that they would be prepared to extend their licensing of activities commonly frowned on elsewhere into other fields. For it would appear, from a recent study in this field, that more than half of the state’s total public income comes from taxes attributable to the gambling enterprise. 2
I take judicial notice that Nevada simply cannot afford to lose its gambling business, for its loss would not only affect the tax take,- — the loss of employment might be catastrophic, — loss of jobs not only by employees of the gambling casinos themselves but by employees of hotels, restaurants, liquor saloons, and merchandising establishments which would have to fold up when there were no longer gambling crov/ds to service. As could be expected, the State has gone to great lengths to protect its peculiar institution; and in doing so it has been mindful that he who stirs the devil’s broth must needs use a long spoon. For the whole of the State’s system of licensing gambling establishments shows its preoccupation with the fear that the wrong kind of people may get control of these enterprises. Thus Nevada statutes provide that it is the policy of the State that all establishments where gambling games are conducted should be licensed and controlled “so as to better protect the public health, safety, morals, good order and general welfare of the inhabitants” of the State, and any license issued to any such establishment is “deemed to be a revocable privilege and no holder thereof shall be deemed to have * * * any vested rights therein or thereunder.” Nevada Revised Statutes Sec. 463.130.
The State Gaming Commission and the Control Board are granted “full and absolute power” to deny, suspend or revoke licenses, (Sec. 463.140), and may regulate the games and devices permitted and the “method of operation” of such games. (Sec. 463.150) Express regulations as to “method of operation” proscribe “ * * catering to, assisting, employing or associating with, either socially or in business affairs, persons of notorious or unsavory reputation, or who have extensive police records.” (Regulation 5.010) In~ *649 dicating the care taken to screen out questionable characters, Sec. 463.170 provides that no corporation or association may receive a license unless all persons having any direct or indirect interest therein are individually qualified to be licensed.
The opportunities for rich pickings in this sanctuary for gambling would assuredly be tempting to hoodlums and gangsters. At all hazards these enterprises must be preserved for indigenous Nevadans whose law-abiding propensities could be relied upon. Let the gangsters move in from the underworld where they were forced to operate elsewhere, and the resultant crooked games, cheats, frauds, swindles leading inevitably to gangland style kidnapings and killings would mean the end of Nevada’s rich gambling take. The good people of the State would not tolerate it, and even if they failed to move, the federal government would be pressured to move in and licensed gambling in Nevada would come to an end with even greater celerity than that which saw the end of polygamy in Utah. The interstate travel aspects of the business would make such federal action simple. 3
The hazards incident to the State’s system of licensed gambling and its policy of excluding from such gambling persons', likely to be connected with crime, corruption and criminal enterprises has been expounded by the Supreme Court of thé State. Thus in Nevada Tax Commission v. Hicks, 73 Nev. 115 , 310 P.2d 852, at 854 , the court said: “Throughout this country, then, gambling has necessarily surrounded itself with an aura of crime and corruption. Those in management of this pursuit who have succeeded, have done so not only through a disregard of law, but, in a competitive world, through a superior talent for such disregard and for the corruption of those in public authority.
“For gambling to take its place as a lawful enterprise in Nevada it is not enough that this state has named it lawful. We have but offered it the opportunity for lawful existence. The offer is a risky one, not only for the people of this state, but for the entire nation. Organized crime must not be given refuge here through the legitimatizing of one of its principal sources of income. Nevada gambling, if it is to succeed as a lawful *650 enterprise, must be free from the criminal and corruptive taint acquired by gambling beyond our borders. If this is to be accomplished not only must the operation of gambling be carefully controlled, but the character and background of those who would engage in gambling in this state must be carefully scrutinized.”
The court there noted that gambling, carried on elsewhere unlawfully, “tends there to create as well as to attract a criminal element.” Undoubtedly, this official consciousness of the hazards of gambling attracting a criminal element is based upon experience and a knowledge of local conditions. It seems fair to assume that the necessity for the State to protect itself from the tendency mentioned has led to its statutory requirement that all persons convicted of felony, in Nevada or elsewhere, must register with and be fingerprinted by the police or sheriff. (In Clark County, which contains Las Vegas, and has a population of 127,016, slightly less than that of Fresno, California, 2560 felons registered with the chief of police, or the sheriff during the period January 1, 1961 to February 21, 1962. The number of such felons who registered previously is not available to me.) The autobiography of one of the best known gambling proprietors in the State describes how, years ago racketeers and mobsters operated a gambling establishment, with cribs on the side, how they destroyed another so-called club, and how the author saved his own place when he pulled his gun and threatened to shoot seven hoodlums when they came in to wreck his place. 4 When the Nevada authorities contemplated the hazards incident to the operation of gambling, it is not surprising that they made membership on the Gaming Control Board a full time job. They may well consider that things need watching when more than two percent of a gambling community’s population are ex-convicts.
I have difficulty taking seriously the claim of $150,000 against the hotel for acts which, according to the complaint, came about through “coercion, intimidation and inducement” by the State officials, “by threat of loss of license, upon the hotels of the State.” Jurisdiction here is predicated solely upon the Civil Rights Acts, Sections 1983 and 1985(3) of Title 42 U.S.C.A. The first of these sections creates no cause of action against a private individual. 5 The second one (1985(3)), is the one which provides: “If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire * * * for the purpose of depriving * * * any person * * * of the equal protection of the laws”, etc. Liability under this section can arise only where the wrongful acts are done under color of state authority. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 , 71 S.Ct. 937 , 95 L.Ed. 1253 . 6 But if one or more of the defendants conspiring are state officers, the non-officer defendants may be held. Hoffman v. Halden, 9 Cir., 268 F.2d 280, 298 .
The reason I cannot take this $150,000 claim seriously is that I cannot perceive how these private defendants could be said to have conspired to deny plaintiff *651 equal protection of the law while acting under “coercion, intimidation, and inducement”. On the trial it will not take the judge long to decide whether these damages claimed against the private defendants have any basis.
Another aspect of the complaint presents allegations which I think any person familiar with the State of Nevada would know could not be true. This is the claim that by reason of the acts of the defendants “plaintiff cannot stay at a hotel in the State of Nevada”, and that defendants undertook to “bar plaintiff from the State of Nevada”.
The official action with and concerning the “black book” was not directed to hotels as such. It was directed solely to the purpose of preventing the presence of certain persons “in any licensed establishment”. The most that plaintiff can claim is that he was excluded from a gambling establishment. No other interpretation could possibly be placed upon the black book and the statements which accompanied it. 7
This brings me to the question whether the State of Nevada may validly and constitutionally exclude from the premises where gambling is carried on a person in the position of this plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s rights here involved are those which he has by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment which prohibits the state to deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law and to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. It is too elementary to require extended exposition that much of the action taken by a state which is in the exercise of its police power operates to place limitations upon the use of property, the freedom of action of individuals, and the exercise of rights which the individual may claim in the absence of such legislation. ¡
As stated in Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 , 31 S.Ct. 186 , 55 L.Ed. 112 : “It may be said in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public needs. * * * it may be put forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare.” And in the exercise of this police power the state may make reasonable classifications of individuals and property so that some are treated differently from others providing of other groups is not necessarily banstantial basis for such classification. Kotch v. Board of Riverport Pilot Com’rs., 330 U.S. 552, 556 , 67 S.Ct. 910 , 91 L.Ed. 1093 : “A law which affects the activities of some groups differently from the way in which it affects the activities of other groups is not necessarily banned by the Fourteenth Amendment. * * * Otherwise, effective regulation in the public interest could not be provided, however essential that regulation might be.”
In determining what is state policy, in deciding what purposes of government are to be served by state limitations upon individuals and property, when the state has spoken that is generally the end of the matter because it is within the competence of each state to define its own public purposes. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 , 75 S.Ct. 98 , 99 L.Ed. 27 : “Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs to be served by social legislation, wheth *652 er it be Congress legislating concerning the District of Columbia * * * or the States legislating concerning local affairs.”
We note here that the exercise of power on behalf of the State of Nevada was accomplished by an act or acts of its Gaming Commission or its Gaming Board with or without the assistance of the Governor. But in a federal court it is of no consequence whether the acts were performed by executive or administrative officers purportedly exercising delegated powers or whether they were done by specific enactments of the legislature itself. Whether the delegation here was proper or not does not concern us; — it is not a federal question. Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U.S. 183, 188 , 20 S.Ct. 633 , 44 L.Ed. 725 ; Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165, 170 , 43 S.Ct. 303 , 67 L.Ed. 590 . See also Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.S. 552, 562, 563 , 26 S.Ct. 144 , 50 L.Ed. 305 .
Almost without number are the decisions of the courts holding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. “Laws passed for the suppression of immorality, in the interest of health, to secure fair trade practices, and to safeguard the interests of depositors in banks, have been found consistent with due process.” Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 526 , 54 S.Ct. 505, 511 , 78 L.Ed. 940 , citing in footnotes long lists of decisions of the Court illustrating that proposition. All that is required is that the state’s restrictions bear “such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of a permitted classification.” State of Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396 , 47 S.Ct. 630, 631 , 71 L.Ed. 1115 . “It is also well established that, when a state exerting its recognized authority, undertakes to suppress what it is free to regard as a public evil, it may adopt such measures having reasonable relation to that end as it may deem necessary in order to make its action effective. * * * With the wisdom of the exercise of that judgment the court has no concern; and unless it clearly appears that the enactment has no substantial relation to a proper purpose, it cannot be said that the limit of legislative power has been transcended. To hold otherwise would be to substitute judicial opinion of expediency for the will of the legislature, — a notion foreign to our constitutional system.” Purity Extract Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 201 , 33 S.Ct. 44 , 57 L.Ed. 184 . 8
It follows from these considerations that where the anticipated evils, sought to be prevented or restricted, are particularly serious, or where extreme harm may be anticipated, the remedies to be applied may be more drastic if the state authorities reasonably regard such drastic remedies as necessary to protect the state against the anticipated harm. The more serious the threat to the state’s welfare, the more drastic the remedy which may be applied.8 9
In the case before us the problem of excluding hoodlums from gambling places in the State of Nevada can well be regarded by the State authorities as a mat *653 ter almost of life or death. It would be altogether out of place for any court, and particularly a federal court, to say that the State of Nevada could not reasonably anticipate serious and adverse consequences to its peculiar institution if the criminal element is permitted to participate in gambling in its casinos.
When this case is tried, if the legislative facts properly to be considered in passing upon the constitutional validity of the orders here complained of, including some of the matters of which I have here assumed to take judicial notice, are developed for the benefit of the court, I think that the court will have no difficulty in finding that the Gaming Board and the Gaming Commission would apprehend the serious possibility of persons of that character carrying into the establishment loaded dice, marked cards, and other means for cheating or otherwise disrupting the orderly conduct of the licensed gambling. The Board’s finding that the mere entry of such a person threatened harm, could not be questioned by the court. 10
What this case will boil down to in the end is the question whether the State of Nevada may validly exclude convicted felons and ex-convicts from gambling establishments. Plaintiff’s complaint states that the basis for his designation as “undesirable” is “the claimed criminal record of plaintiff.” The complaint discloses that he had been previously convicted of a felony. It seems too plain to require argument, that a state may validly refuse the privilege of gambling to such a person.
Gambling or being in or about a gambling establishment is a mere matter of governmental favor; it has none of the aspects of property or other private right. In that respect the gambling casino or any other establishment would stand on no higher plane than that of a business of dealing in liquor for non-beverage purposes which was discussed in Ma-King Products Co. v. Blair, 271 U.S. 479 , 46 S.Ct. 544 , 70 L.Ed. 1046 . In that case the government official refused a permit to operate a plant for denaturing alcohol although the Commission had power to grant such a permit. The Supreme Court quoted with approval language of the Court of Apeáis as follows: “The holder of such a permit is entrusted by the government with a power which subjects him to the approaches and bribes of lawbreakers, and where, as in this case, the business associations of applicants have been with men whose conduct has already invited prohibition prosecutions against them, it goes without saying that the Commissioner would have been derelict in duty in granting them a permit.” Such a conclusion is so rational and so compelling that it was not even suggested in that case that the complaining parties had been denied any constitutional right.
The complaint is made that the black book was made up without notice or hearing to the persons listed therein. It is unnecessary to consider here whether some of the persons whose names appear in that black book may have been placed there merely because the control board considered them to be persons of bad reputation or known hoodlums or associates of such persons. The decision of this case does not require an inquiry as to whether some such persons might be entitled to notice and hearing before they were placed in an excluded category. Possibly the question of identity, reputation, association with others, would be an appropriate matter for inquiry at a *654 hearing. But plaintiff must stand upon his own rights; he cannot attack the constitutionality of the State’s action as it affects persons other than himself. “Ordinarily, one may not claim standing in this Court to vindicate the constitutional rights of some third party.” Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 , 73 S.Ct. 1031, 1034 , 97 L.Ed. 1586 . See in accord Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U.S. 114, 118 , 20 S.Ct. 284 , 44 L.Ed. 392 ; Aikins v. Kingsbury, 247 U.S. 484, 489 , 38 S.Ct. 558 , 62 L.Ed. 1226 . 11
The placing of this plaintiff’s name in the black book list of persons not permitted to enter gambling establishments cannot be questioned on any ground that I can perceive for plaintiff cannot with reason attack a determination that a person convicted of a felony is not permitted to enter a gambling establishment. He is not in a position to contend that he is not such a person for his complaint admits that he is. It cannot be said that in this situation where an admitted ex-convict is about to make himself at home in a gambling establishment, that nothing can be done about excluding him until after service of notice and time fixed for hearing.
It is erroneous to assume that a state may never take action without notice and hearing to persons to be affected. Laws are regularly passed, regulations adopted, without a hearing. 12 In view of the situation of peril which, as we have noted, always surrounds gambling in Nevada, the trial court may well find that plaintiff’s entry upon the gambling premises would present an emergency comparable to that presented by an animal running at large while suspected of being afflicted with the foot and mouth disease.
. “The short of the matter is that we have an extremely important question, probably affecting all cost-plus-fixed-fee war contractors and many of their employees immediately, and ultimately affecting by a vast sum the cost of fighting the war. No conclusion in such a case should prudently be rested on an indefinite factual foundation. * * * The hearing of contentions as to disputed facts, the sorting of documents to select relevant provisions, ascertain their ultimate form and meaning in the case, the practical construction put on them by the parties and reduction of the mass of conflicting contentions as to fact and inference from facts, is a task primarily for a court of one judge, not for a court of nine.
“We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the District Court that tribunal lacked power or justification for applying the summary judgment procedure. But summary procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung import, on which this Court should draw inferences with caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and practice.”
. “The New Gambling King” by Keith Monroe, Harpers Magazine, January, 1962, Vol. 224, No. 1340: “Sparsely populated states are understandably envious of Nevada (second least populous of all) because its state goverment takes in $8 million in taxes on gambling operators, plus $10 million in sales taxes plucked mostly from out-of-state seekers of ‘Nevada fun.’ This sum pays more than half of Nevada’s expenses. Consequently the tax burden of its 285.000 residents is light. To lighten it further, in 1950 the Nevada legislature passed a law legalizing prostitution, but this was vetoed by the governor.”
. The extent of the facilities provided to carry trade to the Nevada gambling is almost beyond belief. Every day 88 scheduled airplane flights from other states reach Las Vegas. (This does not include the chartered and other non-scheduled flights such as Hacienda’s.) Eortyeight daily scheduled plane flights reach Reno. There are as many scheduled flights from Phoenix to Las. Vegas as there are from Phoenix to Los Angeles. A few of these flights are subsidized by the gambling industry. See Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 9 cir., (Jan. 16, 1962), 298 F.2d 430 . Hacienda flights are advertised as including “free round trip”, “de luxe rooms”, “two bottles of champagne”, etc., in the yellow pages of the San Francisco telephone book. High speed highways carry automobile traffic from Phoenix, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Sacramento, and elsewhere. All this provides for what may be called the “carriage trade”.
But aside from this, the author referred to in footnote 2, supra, notes that with the aid of a well known research institute, a large gambling proprietor developed a rewarding source of customers among these Californians who, not owning cars, yet had spending money. Recruited through an advertising campaign in San Francisco, Sacramento, Stockton and 28 other California cities, these generally low income, often elderly, citizens travel in chartered Greyhound buses, ordinarily 20 loads per day, with average load of 30.2 passengers per bus. According to the report, one-fifth of these passengers had made the trip eight times. As soon as the passenger enters the establishment his fare is refunded him. The author suggests that many of these low income customers shortly wind up on the California relief rolls. “ ‘If we could pay their [Researcher’s] fee’, said the head of one Salvation Army office, ‘we’d be interested to learn just how huge a case load they’ve added here by helping [the gambling house proprietor] attract people from this, town.’ ”
All that would be required in the way of Congressional action would be an act utilizing the rationale of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2421 et seq. Compare Public Law 87-228, Sept. 13, 1961, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952 .
. Harold S. Smith, Sr.: “I Want To Quit Winners”, (Prentice-Hall, 1961) pp. 165, 167.
. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175-176 , 81 S.Ct. 473, 478 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 : “While one * * * scourge of the evil — perhaps the leading one — was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against it or its members but against those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law.” See also, Kenney v. Hatfield, D.C., 132 F.Supp. 814 , affirmed 6 Cir., 232 F.2d 288 , 289-290; Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club, 8 Cir., 183 F.2d 440, 443 ; Shemaitis v. Froemke, 7 Cir., 189 F.2d 963 ; Bottone v. Lindsley, 10 Cir., 170 F.2d 705, 706 .
. This case was brought under what is now Title 42, § 1985(3). The decision reversed this court which had reversed Judge Yankwich, 9 Cir., 183 F.2d 308 . Judge Yankwich, discussing the action, had stated, (Hardyman v. Collins, D.C., 80 F.Supp. 501, 510 ): “No cases exist where an action either civil or criminal has been maintained against private persons who interfered with such rights.”
. Plaintiff tries to suggest that if the Desert Inn is prohibited from receiving him, then he cannot enter or stay at any hotel; that this means excluding him from the State. It is true that many Nevada hotels, like the Desert Inn, have gambling casinos. Whether, as a matter of Nevada law, they would be regarded as innkeepers, with casinos, or as casinos with room facilities attached, I would not know. But I do know that Nevada is plentifully supplied with convenient and even luxurious motels, many of them having no gambling facilities. That plaintiff could find no place to eat or sleep appears incredible.
. Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 246 , 61 S.Ct. 862, 865 , 85 L.Ed. 1305 : “We are not concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation. Differences of opinion on that score suggest a choice which ‘should be left where * * * it was left by the Constitution — to the States and to Congress.’ ” See in accord, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 , 57 S.Ct. 578 , 81 L.Ed. 703 ; State of Ohio ex rel. Clark v. Deckebach, supra.
. Illustrations of drastic state action are Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 , 48 S.Ct. 246 , 72 L.Ed. 568 (compelled cutting of all red cedar trees) ; Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 , 47 S.Ct. 584 , 71 L.Ed. 1000 (compulsory sexual sterilization of persons with hereditary insanity) ; Hadacbeck v. [Los Angeles], Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 , 36 S.Ct. 143 , 60 L.Ed. 348 (destruction of large values of brick clay deposits through municipal zoning) ; Sentell v. New Orleans &c. Railroad Co., 166 U.S. 698 , 705, 17 S.Ct. 693 , 696, 41 L.Ed. 1169 , refers to the holding that “a house may be pulled down or blown up by the public authorities is necessary to avert or stay a general conflagration”, and to “the power to kill diseased cattle, to destroy obscene books or pictures, or gambling instruments.”
. The complaint contains a paragraph alleging that on the evening when plaintiff was excluded from the gambling premises (which plaintiff insists on referring to as “hotel”), the officers confiscated cards and dice. The complaint alleges that this was done to harass and intimidate the hotel operators. If the cards and dice were confiscated, it is a more probable inference that this was done to safeguard against the possible consequences of the plaintiff having been on the gambling premises.
For a reference to a celebrated instance of the development of legislative facts for the court, see Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 419 , 28 S.Ct. 324 , 52 L.Ed. 551 .
. Plaintiff does not base any claims upon the fact that the “black book” lists but a few persons. I think that circumstance cannot aid him. As stated in Buck v. Bell, supra, ( 274 U.S. at 208 , 47 S.Ct. at 585 ): “But, it is said, however it might be if this reasoning were applied generally, it fails when it is confined to the small number who are in the institutions named and is not applied to the multitudes outside. It is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out shortcomings of this sort. But the answer is that the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow. Of course so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached.”
. Suppose a state highway commission causes to be placed on the highway a sign saying: “Tractors with lugs not permitted on the road.” As a farmer tries to drive his tractor with lugs on the highway, a patrol officer stops him and prevents his passage. No one would suggest that this action was unlawful because no hearing was had. I find difficulty in concluding that keeping a felon from entering a gambling establishment presents any different situation.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9448472. Public record. Not legal advice.
