# Mary Ann Waynick v. Chicago's Last Department Store, an Illinois Corporation

> Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · September 1, 1959 · 269 F.2d 322

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9446929

## Case

- **Full name:** Mary Ann WAYNICK Et Al., PlaintiffsAppellants, v. CHICAGO’S LAST DEPARTMENT STORE, an Illinois Corporation, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
- **Decided:** September 1, 1959
- **Citations:** 269 F.2d 322
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Knoch
- **Judges:** Knoch, Enoch, Schnackenberg, Knock, Castle
- **Cited by:** 81 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9446929

## Opinion text

KNOCH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I find myself in agreement with my distinguished colleagues that neither the Michigan nor the Illinois Dram Shop Acts apply and that the Michigan common law governs. I am also in agreement that under Illinois law the Illinois Dram Shop Act cannot be said to have any extraterritorial coverage. Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill.App. 151 , 95 N.E.2d 512 , 22 A.L.R.2d 1123 .
The majority holds that the common law by virtue of the penal statute (Sec. 131, Ch. 43, 1951 Illinois Revised Statutes, which makes sales of liquor to intoxicated persons unlawful) gives a civil right of action in tort against the sellers. With this conclusion I cannot agree.
It should be noted that-this is a penal statute providing for the punishment of those selling to intoxicated persons and thereby is of general good to the public. It confers no specific rights to private individuals.
“It was not a tort at common law to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ‘a strong and able-bodied man,’ and it can be said safely, that it is not anywhere laid down in the books that such act was ever held, at common law, to be culpable negligence that would impose legal liability for damages upon the vendor or donor of such liquor.” Cruse v. Aden, 1889, 127 Ill. 231, 234 , 20 N.E. 73 , 74.
I cannot accept the distinction made— that an intoxicated person is not an “able-bodied man” — because that would, in effect, eliminate any reason for the enactment of the Dram Shop Act.
The majority opinion states that “If the common law does not cover the situation before us, there is actually no law applicable * * * nature abhors a vacuum; so does the law.”
*327 Prior to the enactment of the Dram Shop Act, tavern keepers and owners had no liability. By the same reasoning, one can say that a total and absolute vacuum prevailed as to them. However, the common law has always held accountable those responsible for direct injury to the person or property of another. This is true in the instant case. There is no bar to proceeding against the driver and the owner of the car in question.
It may be socially desirable to hold tavern keepers and owners responsible under the circumstances in this case, but that result, I believe, should be achieved through Congressional act, rather than by judicial interpretation.
The trial court’s order dismissing the complaint not only as to the owners but also as to the tavern keepers is correct and should be affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9446929. Public record. Not legal advice.
