# Hutto v. Benson Newark Ins. Co. v. Benson

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · April 30, 1954 · 212 F.2d 349

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9444141

## Case

- **Full name:** HUTTO v. BENSON Et Al.; NEWARK INS. CO. v. BENSON Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** April 30, 1954
- **Citations:** 212 F.2d 349; 1954 U.S. App. LEXIS 3371
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Simons
- **Judges:** Allen, Simons, Al-Len, Miller
- **Cited by:** 10 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by United States v. Jacobs, 155 F. Supp. 182 (1957).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9444141

## Opinion text

SIMONS, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Basically, the question here presented is the Conflict of Law Rule of the State of Tennessee. That state in Section 8595 of its Code provides that actions for injuries to the person must be brought within one year after the cause of action accrued and under Tennessee law an action accrues when injury is suffered. Texas has a general two-year statute of limitations but, by a provision in its Workmen’s Compensation Act, a plaintiff seeking recovery against a third party tort-feasor must first resort to his remedy under that act and may not sue the third party until such proceedings are concluded and compensation paid or assumed. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals in Buss v. Robison, 255 S.W.2d 339 , held that a claim for damages does not accrue until this condition has been satisfied. The cases on which it relies refer to the provision as a suspension of the statute of limitations.
The question whether in diversity cases the federal courts must follow conflict of law rules prevailing in the states in which they sit, which was left open in Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Company, 304 U.S. 202 , 58 S.Ct. 860 , 82 L.Ed. 1290 , was finally answered in Klaxon Company v. Stentor Company, 313 U.S. 487 , 61 S.Ct. 1020, 1021 , 85 L.Ed. 1477 , where it was held that the prohibition declared in Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 , against independent determination by the federal court extends to the field of conflict of law. The court said: “The conflict of laws rules to be applied by the federal court in Delaware must conform to those prevailing in Delaware’s state courts. Otherwise, the accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate state and federal courts sitting side by side. See Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, 304 U.S. at [pages] 74-77, 58 S.Ct. [817] at 820-822. Any other ruling would do violence to the principle of uniformity within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. It is not for the federal courts to thwart such local policies * * In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Company, 345 U.S. 514 , 73 S.Ct. 856 , 97 L.Ed. 1211 , the question was by grant of certiorari limited to whether the Pennsylvania *354 Conflicts Rule violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution and it was said that the states are free to adopt such rules of conflict of laws as they choose and that applying the statute of limitations of the forum to a foreign substantive right- did not deny full faith and credit.
My view is that while Texas may deny access to its'courts to those who failed to comply with the condition of its Workmen’s Compensation Act, it has no power to suspend or toll the Tennessee statute of limitations. Doncher v. Marlin Firearms Company, 198 F.2d 821 (2 Cir.), Cauley v. S. E. Massengill Company, D.C. Tenn., 35 F.Supp. 371, 373 . In the latter case, it was said: “Statutes of limitations being designed according to the sound policy of each state for itself to put at rest litigation after the lapse of certain varying periods of time cannot be extended by the legislatures of foreign states, * * Our decisions in Wilson v. Massengill, supra, and Maki v. Cooke, supra, referred to in the majority opinion, reached a different result but, as that opinion demonstrates, they are no longer sound authority in the light of the Wells case, supra.
I think the judgment of the District Court should be affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9444141. Public record. Not legal advice.