# Brannan, Secretary of Agriculture v. Stark Dairymen's League Co-Operative Ass'n, Inc. v. Stark

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · November 9, 1950 · 185 F.2d 871

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442663

## Case

- **Full name:** BRANNAN, Secretary of Agriculture, v. STARK Et Al.; DAIRYMEN’S LEAGUE CO-OPERATIVE ASS’N, Inc., v. STARK Et Al.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** November 9, 1950
- **Citations:** 185 F.2d 871; 87 U.S. App. D.C. 388; 1950 U.S. App. LEXIS 3662
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Edgerton
- **Judges:** Edgerton, Clark, Stone
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442663

## Opinion text

EDGERTON, Circuit Judge,
(dissenting)-
The order authorizes payments to a cooperative association only when the Secretary has determined that the association meets the following requirements, among others: “ * * * (2) It operates as a responsible producer-controlled marketing association exercising full authority in the sale of the milk of its members. * * * (5) It maintains, either individually or together with other qualified associations, a competent staff for dealing with marketing problems * * * (7) It collaborates with similar associations in activities incident to the maintenance and strengthening of collective bargaining by producers and the operation of a plan of uniform pricing of milk to handlers.” These services contribute to the stabilizing of what had been a chaotic and depressed industry. They tend to benefit all milk producers. Individuals cannot perform these services for themselves.
The Secretary found that payments to cooperatives that perform these services are incidental to and not inconsistent with the terms and conditions of § 8c(5) of the Act and necessary to effectuate the other provisions of the order. I think he was not unreasonable in so finding and not wrong as a matter of law. “Necessary” does not always mean “indispensable”, “essential”, or “vital”. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 129 , 65 S.Ct. 165 , 89 L.Ed. 118 . Its meaning varies with the context. A night watchman for a manufacturing company has been held “necessary for production” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S. C.A. § 201 et seq., Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 , 64 S.Ct. 320 , 88 L.Ed. 298 , and prohibition of industrial home work has been upheld as “necessary” to an effective minimum-wage order. Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 , 65 S.Ct. 605 , 89 L.Ed. 921 . “All that is needed to support the [Secretary’s] interpretation is that it has ‘warrant in the record’ and a ‘reasonable basis in law’ ”. Unemployment Compensation Commission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153-154 , 67 S.Ct. 245, 250 , 91 L.Ed. 136 . I think his interpretation meets this requirement; the more clearly because the Act directs him to “accord such recognition and encouragement to producer-owned and producer-controlled cooperative associations as will be in harmony with the policy toward cooperative associations set forth in existing Acts of Congress, and as will tend to promote efficient methods of marketing and distribution.” 49 Stat. 767 , 7 U.S.C.A. § 610 (b)(1).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442663. Public record. Not legal advice.