# McClain v. Lufkin Industries, Inc. > Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit · August 8, 2011 · 649 F.3d 374 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442104 ## Case - **Full name:** Sylvester McCLAIN, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Buford Thomas, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Patrick Ross, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Mary Thomas, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Eddie K. Mask, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Leroy Garner, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Sherry Calloway Swint, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Walter Butler, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons Also Known as “A”; Florine Thompson, on Her Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Clarence Owens, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons Also Known as “C”; Clifford R. Duirden, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Earl Potts, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Roald Mark, on His Own Behalf and on Behalf of a Class of Similarly Situated Persons; Plaintiff Class; All Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs-Appellants Cross-Appellees, v. LUFKIN INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant-Appellee Cross-Appellant - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit - **Decided:** August 8, 2011 - **Citations:** 649 F.3d 374; 94 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 44,247; 112 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1665; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 16352; 2011 WL 3427105 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Jones - **Judges:** Jones, Dennis, Clement - **Cited by:** 165 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442104 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding the district court erred in find local counsel were readily available, as the record contained numerous affidavits from experts “who swore that no Texas attorneys were willing and able to assist in such a large case that might drag on for years without any guarantee… - holding that “‘[t]he hourly fee awarded must be supported by the record’” (quoting League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Roscoe Indep. Sch. Dist., 119 F.3d 1228, 1234 (5th Cir. 1997)) - stating that “‘reasonable’ hourly rates ‘are to be calculated according to the prevailing market rates in the relevant community’” (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984)) - applying rates applicable where district court sits rather than rates applicable to attorney’s place of work absent certain limited circumstances, such as a showing that out-of-district counsel was necessary to the litigation ## Opinion text EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge, concurring: Although it is unusual, I feel obliged to clarify a couple of points because of Judge Dennis’s concurrence and to add one overarching comment. Judge Dennis suggests that the majority opinion does not “categorically prohibit” district courts from comparing the fees of defense counsel and prevailing plaintiffs’ counsel when statutory fee shifting occurs. The language may not be “categorical,” but it certainly disfavors inquiries on the precise “comparability” of plaintiffs’ and defense counsel’s fees such as the plaintiffs sought here. Because neither Judge Dennis nor the plaintiffs cite any authority besides dicta in Perdue supporting the inapt comparison, and such comparisons are bound to distract district courts from the basic question of the reasonableness of the plaintiffs’ fees, questions of comparability “layer needless complexity” in an area where the law is practical and clear. Judge Dennis also suggests that the majority does not approve the trial court’s characterization of the Goldstein Demchak firm’s services as those of second-chair counsel. Of course we did. This opinion finds error in two of the three relevant findings by the district court, but we do not criticize its third finding, that “Gold-stein Demchak attorneys performed second-chair trial duties.... ” Moreover, we note that because the district court “carefully tailored the award, adjusting it, inter alia, for the second-chair role played by the firm,” it may have to reconsider all aspects of the fee award. No clear error was shown in this finding by the district court, which reviewed the previous proceedings thoroughly. This finding by the district court is not reversed, and it may become relevant on remand. It cannot escape the reader’s attention that the Goldstein Demchak firm has been authorized to receive several million dollars in fees, and a million dollars in expenses, for prevailing in this protracted case. But to them, that’s not enough, and they seek an hourly increase that will add $3 million more to their award. If that happens, the attorneys will have received *388 nearly double the dollar award of the plaintiffs. What has fee shifting come to? This is not an appeal about incentivizing modestly compensated attorneys for pursuing noble goals: the $400 hourly rate awarded to Mr. Garrigan is hardly a day laborer’s fee. This appeal is designed simply to enrich, not to enhance or encourage. The Supreme Court holds that fee-shifting cannot bring a windfall to attorneys. See Rivera, supra. On remand, the district court should exercise its discretion within the parameters we have set out to prevent a windfall recovery. See Hensley, supra. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9442104. Public record. Not legal advice.