# Blackwell v. Federal Bureau of Investigation

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · July 1, 2011 · 646 F.3d 37

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9441910

## Case

- **Full name:** Roger BLACKWELL, Appellant v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and United States Department of Justice, Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** July 1, 2011
- **Citations:** 646 F.3d 37; 396 U.S. App. D.C. 164; 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 13387; 2011 WL 2600831
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rogers
- **Judges:** Rogers, Kavanaugh, Williams
- **Cited by:** 388 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9441910

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding explanations adequate where declarant explained that “[t]he release of specifics of these investigative techniques would risk circumvention of the law by individuals who seek to utilize computers in violation of laws. By releasing that information, the FBI would be exp…
- holding that, because the records sought were “generated in the course of investigating and prosecuting [plaintiff] on insider trading charges[, they] were quite obviously related to the [agency]’s law enforcement duties” and “easily qualif[ied]” for the Exemption 7 threshold
- holding that “details about procedures used during the forensic examination of a computer by an FBI forensic examiner ... are undoubtedly ‘techniques’ or ‘procedures’ used for ‘law enforcement investigations’ ” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)
- concluding that Exemption 7(E) was properly applied to “‘details about procedures used during the forensic examination of a computer’ by an FBI forensic examiner[,]” as well as associated data collection procedures, which are “not known to the public”
- finding agency met “low bar” where it provided affidavits stating that information about forensic examination procedures would expose computer forensic vulnerabilities to potential criminals and help criminals circumvent the law

## Opinion text

ROGERS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately to make clear that the court rejects the government’s broadly stated position that under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), “a FOIA requester’s desire to obtain Brady [ 1 ] material is not a public interest for purposes of Exemption 7(C).” Appellee’s Br. 22. To the extent the government’s position suggests that when a requester seeks exculpatory evidence for purposes of a direct appeal or a collateral attack on his conviction disclosure of such information is categorically not in the public interest for purposes of FOIA Exemption 7(C), this misreads precedent. To the contrary, an individual’s “personal stake in the release of the requested information is ‘irrelevant’ to the balancing of public and third-party privacy interests required by Exemption 7(C),” Roth v. Dep’t of Justice, 642 F.3d 1161, 1177 (D.C.Cir.2011) (quoting Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1327 (D.C.Cir.2000)), and “the public might well have a significant interest in knowing whether the federal government engaged in blatant Brady violations,” id. This court has not applied a per se rule and does not do so today. See, e.g., Boyd v. Crim. Div. of the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 475 F.3d 381, 387-88 (D.C.Cir.2007); see also Martin v. Dep’t of Justice, 488 F.3d 446, 453, 456-58 (D.C.Cir.2007).
The court applies the standard in National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 , 158 L.Ed.2d 319 (2004), whereby a FOIA requester, to overcome the government’s authority not to disclose pursuant to Exemption 7(C), must “produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might have occurred.” id. at 174 , 124 S.Ct. 1570 . With no additional thumb on the scale, the court concludes that Blackwell does not meet this standard. Op. at 41. Because Blackwell has not as an evidentiary matter demonstrated that the government failed to comply with its duty of disclosure of exculpatory material at the time of his trial or appeal or that it is currently withholding evidence that demonstrates his innocence of the crimes of which he was convicted, his request fails under the Favish standard; no per se rule is applied.
. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9441910. Public record. Not legal advice.