# Whalen v. Massachusetts Trial Court

> Court of Appeals for the First Circuit · February 4, 2005 · 397 F.3d 19

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9440157

## Case

- **Full name:** James M. WHALEN, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT; William W. Teahan, Jr., Robert F. Kumor, Barbara A. Dortch-Okara; Robert E. Fein, Defendants, Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
- **Decided:** February 4, 2005
- **Citations:** 397 F.3d 19; 22 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 513; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 1829; 2005 WL 268050
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stahl
- **Judges:** Torruella, Coffin, Stahl
- **Cited by:** 73 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9440157

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that, when the termination is in good faith directed at positions rather than individuals, a hearing loses its relevance, and that, additionally, because reorganizations often affect numerous employees, the governmental interest in efficient administration weighs heavily
- finding "no continuing violation of federal law to enjoin" when laid-off employee asked for restoration of pension and retirement credit after reinstatement, because relief sought was designed to compensate him for his termination, a past injury (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 71 )
- holding that state courts are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity
- stating that where “it seems inescapable that [an employee’s] job *292 performance” influenced selection for a reorganization layoff, it is fundamental “that some process is due”

## Opinion text

STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge
(Dissenting).
At the time Whalen was targeted for layoff based on performance-related factors, the law was such that a reasonable officer, when selecting an employee for removal based on such factors, was on notice that such an employee was entitled to due process. The fact that budgetary constraints prompted the officials to evaluate Whalen’s performance is irrelevant— even in this “novel factual cireumstance[ ],” the “officials [were] still on notice” that Whalen was entitled to some form of due process as soon as factors other than seniority were considered in his being selected for removal. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).
In their search through our precedent for a perfect factual match to the facts of this case, my brethren ignore the Supreme Court’s clear direction in Hope v. Pelzer that “[although earlier cases involving ‘fundamentally similar’ facts can provide especially strong support for a conclusion that the law is clearly established, they are not necessary to such a finding.” Id. Indeed, this same error was made by four members of this court sitting en banc in Savard v. Rhode Island, 338 F.3d 23 (1st Cir.2003) (en banc) (opinion of Selya, J.), when this Court evenly divided over the propriety of such a search for the perfect precedential match. The proper inquiry is “whether the state of the law [at the time of the action] gave [Appellees] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [Whalen] was unconstitutional.” See Hope, 536 U.S. at 741 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 . And here, the answer is unequivocally yes.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9440157. Public record. Not legal advice.