# Lederman, Robert v. United States

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · May 31, 2002 · 291 F.3d 36

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439299

## Case

- **Full name:** Robert LEDERMAN, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Et Al., Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** May 31, 2002
- **Citations:** 291 F.3d 36; 351 U.S. App. D.C. 386; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10271; 2002 WL 1071927
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Silberman
- **Judges:** Edwards, Silberman, Tatel
- **Cited by:** 61 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439299

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that it likely would be constitutional for the Board to “require permits for demonstrations on the sidewalk [at the foot of the steps on the East Front of the Capitol], limit the duration of such demonstrations, restrict the number of individuals who may demonstrate…
- stating that "courts have long recognized that [the areas in question] meet the definition of a traditional public forum: They have traditionally been open to the public, and their intended use is consistent with public expression"
- finding that although regulatory qualifiers "cannot begin to satisfy the narrow tailoring requirement” the regulation was not grossly unconstitutional because the regulation made some attempt to narrow its breadth
- rejecting the proposition that “demonstrators of any stripe pose a greater security risk to the Capitol building and its occupants than do pedestrians, who may come and go anonymously, travel in groups of any size, carry any number of bags and boxes, and linger as long as they…

## Opinion text

SILBERMAN, Senior Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the court’s opinion. We are certainly bound by Jeannette Rankin Brigade v. Chief of Capitol Police, 342 F.Supp. 575 (D.D.C.1972) (three judge panel), aff'd, 409 U.S. 972 , 93 S.Ct. 311 , 34 L.Ed.2d 236 (1972). However, I think it is distinctly possible that the later Supreme Court case, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 , 103 S.Ct. 1702 , 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983), particularly the Court’s implicit rejection of Justice Marshall’s position that the whole of the Supreme Court’s grounds are a traditional public forum, betokens a more sympathetic reception to the government’s arguments. To be sure, Jeannette Rankin Brigade was summarily affirmed, but the Court rarely considers itself bound by the reasoning of its prior opinions— which is why I have referred to it as a “noncourt court,” see United States v. Moore, 110 F.3d 99, 102 (D.C.Cir.1997) (Silberman, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) — let alone a summary affirmance. (Of course, the Court’s reluctance to offend Congress would not be irrelevant.)
*49 In light of my doubts as to how this case win be received by the Supreme Court if certiorari is granted, I join my colleagues’ treatment of the Bivens claim. However, I am inclined to think that under applicable immunity law each of the police officer’s conduct should be judged as if he were the lawyer for the Capitol Police.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439299. Public record. Not legal advice.
