# Hall, Sheryl L. v. Clinton, Hillary R.

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · April 5, 2002 · 285 F.3d 74

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439293

## Case

- **Full name:** Sheryl L. HALL, Appellant, v. Hillary Rodham CLINTON, in Her Personal Capacity, and DNC Services Corporation D/B/A Democratic National Committee, Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** April 5, 2002
- **Citations:** 285 F.3d 74; 350 U.S. App. D.C. 422; 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 6216; 2002 WL 506862
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Randolph
- **Judges:** Henderson, Randolph, Rogers
- **Cited by:** 80 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439293

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that where issue in prior case was “whether the CSRA ‘constituted the sole remedy for [Defendant’s] alleged conduct,’” even plaintiff’s new claims in separate suit “[were] not new issues but simply new legal theories”
- holding that CSRA-preemption finding in earlier section 1985 case had preclusive effect on case involving same parties but concerning only common-law tort claims
- holding that the Department may represent the First Lady under 28 U.S.C. § 517 “even if” she were a deemed a “purely private citizen at all times relevant”
- holding that a plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1985 when the alleged conspiracy does not focus on an actionable wrong
- noting that civil conspiracy “serves . . . as a device through which vicarious liability for the underlying wrong may be imposed upon all who are a party to it” (internal quotation marks omitted)

## Opinion text

Randolph, Circuit Judge,
concurring: If the government had raised a separation of powers argument in support of its claim that the Justice Department’s decision to represent now-Senator Clinton is non-reviewable, I might have been persuaded to reach a different conclusion in this case. See U.S. Const., art. II, § 3. Several cases, perhaps dating as far back as Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408 , 2 Dall. 409 , 1 L.Ed. 436 (1792), have reviewed the Attorney General’s decision to undertake legal representation in pending cases. But see Maeva Marcus, Hayburn’s Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 527 , 535 (concluding that the real issue in Hayburn’s Case was whether Attorney General Randolph had the power to proceed without specific authorization from the President). But none of these cases expressly addresses whether the separation of powers inherent in the Constitution precluded the courts from questioning the judgment of the Executive Branch on such a matter. See, e.g., Booth v. Fletcher, 101 F.2d 676, 681-82 (D.C.Cir.1938); Meredith v. Van Oosterhout, 286 F.2d 216, 220 (8th Cir.1960); Int’l Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 , 408 (2d Cir.1963); Brawer v. Horowitz, 535 F.2d 830, 834-35 (3d Cir.1976). The issue therefore remains open. See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 , 45 S.Ct. 148, 149 , 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9439293. Public record. Not legal advice.