# Shrum v. City of Coweta

> Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · June 8, 2006 · 449 F.3d 1132

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437708

## Case

- **Full name:** Rex SHRUM, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF COWETA, OKLAHOMA, a Municipal Corporation; Steven C. Whitlock, Individually, Defendants, and Derrick Palmer, Individually, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 8, 2006
- **Citations:** 449 F.3d 1132; 24 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 993; 88 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 42,412; 98 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 499; 152 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 60,205; 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 14170
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Briscoe
- **Judges:** Briscoe, McWilliams, McConnell
- **Cited by:** 56 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437708

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a court should not require a showing of “public concern” or engage in judicial balancing of the employer’s interest against the employee’s interest when the public employee alleges retaliation for participation in a union with which his employer has signed a colle…
- noting that “Free Exercise Clause is not limited to acts motivated by religious hostility,” but protects “the ‘free exercise of religion’ from unwarranted governmental inhibition whatever its source”
- holding that retaliatory changes in work schedule infringed on employee’s First Amendment rights

## Opinion text

*1146 BRISCOE, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I write only to address Chief Palmer’s textual argument that the free exercise clause is not implicated because Shram is not challenging the enactment or enforcement of any law, regulation, or ordinance. I would reach the same conclusion on the issue as the majority, but I would - rely instead upon our decision in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir.2004), and prior Supreme Court cases. Chief Palmer devotes a mere paragraph to his textual argument, without citation to any legal authority other than the text of the First Amendment. Shram’s brief does not even respond to the argument. In my view, it is sufficient to note, as the majority has, that the Supreme Court has assumed on several occasions that the free exercise clause is not as restricted as Chief Palmer suggests here. More recently, in Axson-Flynn , we assumed that the free exercise clause was not restricted to challenges involving a law, regulation, or ordinance. There, the plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the staff of the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program, alleging, in part, that the staff forced her to say offensive words contrary to her religious beliefs in violation of the free exercise clause. Id. at 1294 . We concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the staffs requirement that students perform acting exercises as written was pretextual or a neutral rule of general applicability. Id. In a footnote, we clarified that our “use of the word “rales” ... mean[t] a state’s or state actor’s laws, regulations, or other policies which act on private persons.” Id. at 1294 n. 17. As is evident from Axsonr-Flynn, government conduct is subject to the free exercise clause’s protections.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437708. Public record. Not legal advice.