# Murrell Ex Rel. Jones v. School District No. 1 > Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · August 4, 1999 · 186 F.3d 1238 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437033 ## Case - **Full name:** Penelope C. MURRELL, on Her Own Behalf and as Mother and Guardian Ad Litem of Penelope C. Jones; And Penelope C. Jones, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, DENVER, COLORADO, Also Known as Denver Public Schools; School District No. 1, Board of Education, Also Known as Denver Public Schools Board of Education; Vivian Johnston, Individually and in Her Capacity as Principal of George Washington High School; Kathleen Brady, Individually and in Her Capacity as Teacher; Nelia Hicks, Individually and in Her Capacity as Teacher; Irv Moskowitz, in His Capacity as the Superintendent of Denver Public Schools, Defendants-Appellees, Now Legal Defense and Education Fund; ACLU Women’s Rights Project; Connecticut Women’s Education and Legal Defense Fund; Equal Rights Advocates; National Women’s Law Center; Northwest Women’s Law Center; Texas Civil Rights Project; Title IX Advocacy Project; Women’s Legal Defense Fund; National Association of School Psychologists; National Association of School Workers; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; United States of America, Amici Curiae - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - **Decided:** August 4, 1999 - **Citations:** 186 F.3d 1238; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 4893; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18198; 1999 WL 569138 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Anderson - **Judges:** Seymour, Anderson, Lucero - **Cited by:** 275 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437033 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding that a high school student capable of functioning at only a first-grade level sufficiently pled deliberate indifference under Title IX by alleging that she was subjected to a month-long pattern of severe sexual assault, that specific school personnel had actual know… - recognizing that school superintendents may have the power to intervene in Title IX violations, but declining to list the job titles of those officials who do or do not possess such control “[b]ecause officials’ roles vary among school districts” and it is “necessarily [a] fac… - stating that school district is hable only where it has made a conscious decision to permit sex discrimination, and precludes liability where the school district could not have remedied that harassment because it had no knowledge of it or had no authority to respond to it - concluding that the plaintiff stated a claim for supervisory liability for sexual harassment under § 1983 by alleging that the supervisors “knew about [the harassment] and acquiesced in that conduct by refusing to reasonably respond to it.” - holding with “little difficulty” the allegations that, due to sexual harassment, plaintiff became a danger to herself and had to leave school to be hospitalized demonstrated that plaintiff had been deprived of education benefits ## Opinion text STEPHEN H. ANDERSON, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: The majority wisely “declinefs] ... to name job titles that would or would not adequately satisfy” Davis ’ requirement that the school have control over the harassing student for a finding of Title IX liability. Maj. op. at 1247. Davis did not answer this question precisely, leaving liability limited in general terms to cases involving “an official decision by the [Title IX] recipient not to remedy the violation.” — U.S. at-, 119 S.Ct. at 1671 (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 , 118 S.Ct. 1989 , 141 L.Ed.2d 277 (1998)); see also Davis, — U.S. at —, 119 S.Ct. at 1688 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority says not one word about the type of school employee who must know about the harassment before it is actionable.”). I write separately to point out that given the facts of this case, some of the language in the majority’s Title IX analysis is unnecessarily broad. After concluding that Principal Johnston’s alleged deliberate indifference and actual knowledge are enough to trigger liability under Title IX, the majority proceeds to state that “teachers may well possess the requisite control necessary to take corrective action to end ... discrimination.” Maj. op. at 1248. So stating, the majority implies that a single teacher’s inaction may in some circumstances be enough to trigger Title IX liability. That question is not before us in this case, at least not at this juncture. There is simply no need for such employee-by-employee analysis, given that the facts alleged clearly amount to an “official decision” by Principal Johnston, the highest-ranking school official, “not to remedy the violation.” Davis, — U.S. at —, 119 S.Ct. at 1671. A single teacher’s sexual misconduct was not enough to subject a recipient to liability in Gebser , and I believe it is still an open question after Davis whether a single teacher’s indifference is ever sufficient for recipient liability, notwithstanding the Davis dissent’s characterization of the opinion, see Davis, — U.S. at —, 119 S.Ct. at 1689 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (postulating that a district might “be held liable for a teacher’s failure to remedy peer harassment.”). Moreover, with respect to Ms. Murrell’s Equal Protection Clause claim against the principal and the teachers individually, I emphasize that the “deliberate indifference” standard provides a high hurdle for plaintiffs. Such a high hurdle is necessary, given the myriad contacts which occur daily in this country between teachers and students and between students and their peers. The allegations in this case are so egregious, however, that I agree that Ms. Murrell has stated a claim against the principal and the teachers under the Equal Protection Clause. Whether less egregious facts will suffice in future cases remains to be seen. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9437033. Public record. Not legal advice.