# Ashcroft v. Iqbal > Supreme Court of the United States · May 18, 2009 · 556 U.S. 662 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435340 ## Case - **Full name:** ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL, Et Al. v. IQBAL Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** May 18, 2009 - **Citations:** 556 U.S. 662; 129 S. Ct. 1937; 173 L. Ed. 2d 868; 2009 U.S. LEXIS 3472 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Breyer - **Judges:** Kennedy, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer - **Cited by:** 156,718 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97 (2014). - Negative treatments: 6 - Distinguished by: 99 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435340 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining " For example, after listing 15 U.S.C. § 1692d(2), which prohibits debt collectors from using obscene or profane language when collecting a debt, Minor states, ‘““Use of obscene or profane language on my report (saying I owe you a debt).” (Doc. 1 at 18). Minor does … - finding the following similar allegations conclusory: that particular defendants 7 “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiff]’ to harsh 8 conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or 9… - finding the following similar allegations conclusory: that particular defendants “‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [plaintiff]’ to harsh conditions of confinement ‘as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or natio… - holding that, where all pleadings “plausibly suggest[ ] is that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of ter… ## Opinion text Justice Breyer, dissenting. I agree with Justice Souter and join his dissent. I write separately to point out that, like the Court, I believe it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from interfering with “the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Ante, at 685. But I cannot find in that need adequate justification for the Court’s interpretation of Bell *700 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U. S. 544 (2007), and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons designed to prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second Circuit explained, where a Government defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for managing a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F. 3d 143, 158 (2007). A district court, for example, can begin discovery with lower level Government defendants before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level Government officials. See ibid. Neither the briefs nor the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in general or in the case before us. For this reason, as well as for the independently sufficient reasons set forth in Justice Souter’s opinion, I would affirm the Second Circuit. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435340. Public record. Not legal advice.