# Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. > Supreme Court of the United States · June 8, 2009 · 556 U.S. 868 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435331 ## Case - **Full name:** CAPERTON Et Al. v. A. T. MASSEY COAL CO., INC., Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 8, 2009 - **Citations:** 556 U.S. 868; 21 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 908; 39 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20125; 77 U.S.L.W. 4456; 129 S. Ct. 2252; 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208; 2009 U.S. LEXIS 4157 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Scalia - **Judges:** Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, Alito - **Cited by:** 858 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435331 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that due process “demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualifications. Congress and the states, of course, remain free to impose more rigorous standards for judicial disqualification[.] *** Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection th… - explaining that in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), the Court found that it was not required to decide whether the particular justice was influenced, but whether the situation “would offer a possible temptation to the ave… - finding that the Due Process clause was violated in a civil case where one of the judges on the West Virginia Court of Appeals voted to reverse a $50 million jury verdict against a defendant-corporation after he received “campaign contributions in an extraordinary amount” from… - explaining that due process requires recusal when the judge "has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest in a case" or in other circumstances where as an objective matter "the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decision maker is too high to be c… - holding that there is serious risk of actual bias, based on objective and reasonable perceptions, when a person with a personal stake in a particular case has significant and disproportionate influence in placing a judge on the casó by raising funds, or by directing a judge’s … ## Opinion text Justice Scalia, dissenting. The principal purpose of this Court’s exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law. See this Court’s Rule 10. As The Chief Justice’s dissent makes painfully clear, the principal consequence of today’s decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised in all litigated eases in (at least) those 39 States that elect their judges. This eourse was urged upon us on grounds that it would preserve the public’s confidence in the judicial system. Brief for Petitioners 16. *903 The decision will have the opposite effect. What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation’s judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice. The Court’s opinion will reinforce that perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will come to be known as the Caperton claim. The facts relevant to adjudicating it will have to be litigated— and likewise the law governing it, which will be indeterminate for years to come, if not forever. Many billable hours will be spent in poring through volumes of campaign finance reports, and many more in contesting nonrecusal decisions through every available means. A Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: “Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein.” 8 The Babylonian Talmud: Seder Nezikin, Tractate Aboth, Ch. V, Mishnah 22, pp. 76-77 (I. Epstein ed. 1935) (footnote omitted). Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not. The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed— which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable. In the best of all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any diseernable rule. The answer is obvious. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435331. Public record. Not legal advice.