# Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education

> Supreme Court of the United States · April 17, 2007 · 550 U.S. 81

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435100

## Case

- **Full name:** ZUNI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** April 17, 2007
- **Citations:** 550 U.S. 81; 53 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 739; 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 143; 75 U.S.L.W. 4198; 127 S. Ct. 1534; 167 L. Ed. 2d 449; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4335
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Souter
- **Judges:** Scalia, Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Auto, Scaua, Roberts, Thomas, Souter, Alito
- **Cited by:** 121 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435100

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, in the statutory phrase “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State,” “[t]he word ‘such’ refers to ‘per-pupil expenditures’”
- holding, inter alia, that the question of weight of evidence is reserved exclusively for the trier of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and free to determine the credibility of witnesses
- observing that Supreme Court precedent “is full of statements such as “We begin, as always, with the language of the statute,’ Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001), and replete with the affirmation that, when ‘[g]iven [a] straightforward …
- noting that the “‘[m]eaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000))

## Opinion text

*123 Justice Souter,
dissenting.
I agree with the Court that Congress probably intended, or at least understood, that the Secretary would continue to follow the methodology devised prior to passage of the current statute in 1994, see ante, at 90-91. But for reasons set out in Justice Scalia’s dissent, I find the statutory language unambiguous and inapt to authorize that methodology, and I therefore join Part I of his dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435100. Public record. Not legal advice.