# Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of Education

> Supreme Court of the United States · April 17, 2007 · 550 U.S. 81

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435098

## Case

- **Full name:** ZUNI PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 89 Et Al. v. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** April 17, 2007
- **Citations:** 550 U.S. 81; 53 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 739; 20 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 143; 75 U.S.L.W. 4198; 127 S. Ct. 1534; 167 L. Ed. 2d 449; 2007 U.S. LEXIS 4335
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennedy
- **Judges:** Scalia, Breyer, Stevens, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Auto, Scaua, Roberts, Thomas, Souter, Alito
- **Cited by:** 121 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435098

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that, in the statutory phrase “with per-pupil expenditures . . . above the 95th percentile or below the 5th percentile of such expenditures in the State,” “[t]he word ‘such’ refers to ‘per-pupil expenditures’”
- holding, inter alia, that the question of weight of evidence is reserved exclusively for the trier of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and free to determine the credibility of witnesses
- observing that Supreme Court precedent “is full of statements such as “We begin, as always, with the language of the statute,’ Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 172, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001), and replete with the affirmation that, when ‘[g]iven [a] straightforward …
- noting that the “‘[m]eaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context’” (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132 (2000))

## Opinion text

Justice Kennedy,
with whom
Justice Alito joins, concurring.
The district courts and courts of appeals, as well as this Court, should follow the framework set forth in Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984), even when departure from that framework might serve purposes of exposition. When considering an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, a court first determines “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id., at 842 . If so, “that is the end of the matter.” Ibid. Only if “Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue” should a court consider “whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id., at 843 .
In this case, the Court is correct to find that the plain language of the statute is ambiguous. It is proper, therefore, to invoke Chevron’s rule of deference. The opinion of the Court, however, inverts Chevron’s logical progression. Were the inversion to become systemic, it would create the impression that agency policy concerns, rather than the traditional tools of statutory construction, are shaping the judicial interpretation of statutes. It is our obligation to set a good example; and so, in my view, it would have been preferable, and more faithful to Chevron, to arrange the opinion differently. Still, we must give deference to the author of an opinion in matters of exposition; and because the point does not affect the outcome, I join the Court’s opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9435098. Public record. Not legal advice.