# Locke v. Davey

> Supreme Court of the United States · February 25, 2004 · 540 U.S. 712

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434555

## Case

- **Full name:** LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, Et Al. v. DAVEY
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** February 25, 2004
- **Citations:** 540 U.S. 712; 124 S. Ct. 1307; 158 L. Ed. 2d 1; 2004 U.S. LEXIS 1626
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Thomas
- **Judges:** Rehnquist, Rehnqtjist, Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, Scalia, Thomas
- **Cited by:** 193 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434555

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, "Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect. Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, [respondent’s] claim m…
- holding that state’s denial of funding for scholarship if field of study was preparation for the ministry did not violate the recipient’s rights under the Free Exercise Clause because he was not prevented from studying for the ministry
- finding that Washington had a “substantial” antiestablishment interest, despite the fact that there was “no doubt” that the State could have provided the scholarship in question without violating the Establishment Clause
- stating that “some” actions are permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause and explaining that “[i]f any room exists between the two *792 Religion Clauses, it must be here”

## Opinion text

Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
Because the parties agree that a “degree in theology” means a degree that is “devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith,” Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8, I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case. With this understanding, I join Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The contested statute denies Promise Scholarships to students who pursue “a degree in theology.” See Wash. Admin. Code §250-80-020 (12)(g) (2003) (defining an “‘[eligible student,’” in part, as one who “[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology”); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §28B.10.814 (West 1997) (“No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology”). But the statute itself does not define “theology.” And the usual definition of the term “theology” is not limited to devotional studies. “Theology” is defined as “[t]he study of the nature *735 of God and religious truth” and the “rational inquiry into religious questions.” American Heritage Dictionary 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (1991) (“the study of religious faith, practice, and experience” and “the study of God and his relation to the world”). These definitions include the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.
Assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe that Justice Scalia’s application of our precedents is correct. Because neither party contests the validity of these precedents, I join Justice Scalia’s dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434555. Public record. Not legal advice.