# Lawrence v. Texas

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 26, 2003 · 539 U.S. 558

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434512

## Case

- **Full name:** LAWRENCE Et Al. v. TEXAS
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 26, 2003
- **Citations:** 539 U.S. 558; 123 S. Ct. 2472; 156 L. Ed. 2d 508; 2003 U.S. LEXIS 5013
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Thomas
- **Judges:** Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, O'Connor, Scalja, Rehnquist, Thomas
- **Cited by:** 1,219 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Limited by Sintay v. Martel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 1197 (2010).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 6
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434512

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), which "invalidated a law prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons[,]... was decided under the Equal Protection Clause, but with respect to unmarried persons, the…
- concluding that a Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to two men who had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of their home because, among other things, suc…
- stating that constitutional protections are provided to individuals making personal decisions relating to such matters as procreation and child-rearing because the Constitution demands respect for the autonomy of the person making these decisions and that “[pjersons in a homos…
- holding that while the Due Process Clause of the Constitution protects the right of two individuals of the same sex to engage in mutually consensual private sexual conduct, the case did “not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that h…
- recognizing that the challenged statutes reached “the most private human conduct” and “the most private of places,” seeking to control a personal relationship that, “whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without be…

## Opinion text

Justice Thomas,
dissenting.
I join Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that the law before the Court today “is . . . uncommonly silly.” Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). If I were a member of the Texas Legislature, I would vote to repeal it. Punishing someone for expressing his sexual preference through noncommercial consensual conduct with another adult does not appear to be a worthy way to expend valuable law enforcement resources.
Notwithstanding this, I recognize that as a Member of this Court I am not empowered to help petitioners and others similarly situated. My duty, rather, is to “decide cases ‘agreeably to the Constitution and laws of the United States.’” Id., at 530 . And, just like Justice Stewart, I “can find [neither in the Bill of Rights nor any other part of the *606 Constitution a] general right of privacy,” ibid., or as the Court terms it today, the “liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions,” ante, at 562.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434512. Public record. Not legal advice.
