# Ring v. Arizona > Supreme Court of the United States · June 24, 2002 · 536 U.S. 584 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434307 ## Case - **Full name:** Ring v. Arizona - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 24, 2002 - **Citations:** 536 U.S. 584; 122 S. Ct. 2428; 153 L. Ed. 2d 556; 2002 U.S. LEXIS 4651 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kennedy - **Judges:** Ginsburg, Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Breyer, O'Connor, Rehnquist - **Cited by:** 3,846 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Woodward v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 405 (2013). - Negative treatments: 3 - Distinguished by: 13 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434307 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - recognizing that balancing of aggravating against mitigating factors is a factual finding: "In Alabama, as in Arizona and Florida, defendants are not eligible for the death penalty unless a factfinding is made that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances. A… - stating that U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3E1.1, cmt. n.5. The district Apprendi “held that the Sixth Amendment does not permit a court’s determination regarding acceptance of responsibility defendant to be expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the must be sustained unless cl… - holding that statute allowing trial judge to determine presence or absence of aggravating factors required under state law for imposition of death penalty violated Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions; and stating that the Court did “not reach the Stat… - holding that capital defendants, like non-capital defendants, are entitled under the Sixth Amendment to a jury determination on any fact which increases their maximum punishment, invalidating statute that allowed sentencing judge, rather than jury, to find aggravating circumst… - holding that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial precludes "a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty” where the "enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the functional equivalent of a… ## Opinion text Justice Kennedy, concurring. Though it is still my view that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000), was wrongly decided, Apprendi is now the law, and its holding must be implemented in a principled way. As the Court suggests, no principled reading of Ap-prendi would allow Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639 (1990), to stand. It is beyond question that during the penalty phase of a first-degree murder prosecution in Arizona, the finding of an aggravating circumstance exposes “the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict.” Apprendi, supra, at 494 . When a finding has this effect, Apprendi makes clear, it cannot be reserved for the judge. This is not to say Apprendi should be extended without caution, for the States’ settled expectations deserve our respect. A sound understanding of the Sixth Amendment will allow States to respond to the needs and realities of criminal justice administration, and Apprendi can be read as leaving in place many reforms designed to reduce unfairness in sentencing. I agree with the Court, however, that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together as the law. With these observations I join the opinion of the Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434307. Public record. Not legal advice.