# Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 28, 2001 · 533 U.S. 525

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434147

## Case

- **Full name:** LORILLARD TOBACCO CO. Et Al. v. REILLY, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MASSACHUSETTS, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 28, 2001
- **Citations:** 533 U.S. 525; 121 S. Ct. 2404; 150 L. Ed. 2d 532; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4911
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Souter
- **Judges:** O'Connor, Ii-C, Iii-C, Rehnquist, Scaua, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Iii-B-, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, Ii-A, Ii-B, Scalia
- **Cited by:** 499 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434147

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the Labeling Act preempts state regulations specifically targeting cigarette advertising, but does not preempt state regulation of cigarette use or sales, or imposition of regulations of general applicability, such as zoning, which may have an effect on cigarette …
- holding that advertising restriction on tobacco products advances government interest and collecting cases “acknowledg[ing] the theory that product advertising stimulates demand for products, while suppressed advertising may have the opposite effect”
- holding that requirement that certain advertising be placed more than five feet off the ground should not be analyzed under O’Brien because the “height restriction is an attempt to regulate directly the communicative impact of indoor advertising.”
- finding that a ban on advertising for certain tobacco products within 1,000 feet of a school or playground would effectively “constitute nearly a complete ban on the communication of truthful information” about the products
- stating that the Court’s task was to “identify the domain expressly pre-empted” and that this was aided “by considering the predecessor pre-emption provision and the circumstances in which the current language was adopted”

## Opinion text

Justice Souter,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I join Parts I, II-C, II-D, III-A, III-B-1, III-C, and III-D of the Court’s opinion. I join Part I of the opinion of Justice Stevens concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part. I respectfully dissent from Part III-B-2 of the opinion of the Court, and like Justice Stevens would remand for trial on the constitutionality of the 1,000-foot limit.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434147. Public record. Not legal advice.