# Duncan v. Walker

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 18, 2001 · 533 U.S. 167

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434115

## Case

- **Full name:** Duncan, Superintendent, Great Meadow Correctional Facility v. Walker
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 18, 2001
- **Citations:** 533 U.S. 167; 121 S. Ct. 2120; 150 L. Ed. 2d 251; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4493
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Souter
- **Judges:** O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Stevens, Sou-Ter, Breyer, Ginsburg
- **Cited by:** 2,248 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434115

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “although the Court’s pre-AEDPA decision in Rose v. Lundy prescribed the dismissal of federal habeas corpus petitions containing unexhausted claims, in our post-AEDPA world there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritoriou…
- holding “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post-conviction or other collateral review within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),” and that therefore the section does “not toll the limitation period during the pendency of [a pet…
- holding that “an application for federal habeas corpus review is not an ‘application for State post- conviction or other collateral review’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (d)(2)” and therefore the statutory year was not tolled “during the pendency of respondent’s first…
- explaining that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (internal quotation marks …
- stating that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion” (cleaned up)

## Opinion text

Justice Souter,
concurring.
Although I join the Court’s opinion in full, I have joined Justice Stevens’s separate opinion pointing out that nothing bars a district court from retaining jurisdiction pending complete exhaustion of state remedies, and that a claim for equitable tolling could present a serious issue on facts different from those before us.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434115. Public record. Not legal advice.