# Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 14, 2001 · 532 U.S. 424

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434072

## Case

- **Full name:** Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 14, 2001
- **Citations:** 532 U.S. 424; 14 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 223; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 4673; 2001 Colo. J. C.A.R. 2407; 69 U.S.L.W. 4299; 58 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1641; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3820; 121 S. Ct. 1678; 149 L. Ed. 2d 674; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 3520
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia
- **Judges:** Stevens, Thomas, Scalia, Ginsburg
- **Cited by:** 768 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434072

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding that "courts of appeals must review the proportionality determination 'de novo’ .... 'The factual findings made by the district courts in conducting the excessiveness inquiry, of course, must be accepted unless clearly erroneous .... But the question whether a fine is …
- reasoning that compensatory damages “are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful conduct,” whereas punitive damages "operate as 'private fines’ intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing”
- holding that federal due process requires de novo review of punitive damage awards appealed on constitutional grounds
- explaining that punitive damages are “quasi-criminal, operate as private fines intended to punish the defendant and to deter future wrongdoing,” and reflect the jury’s “moral condemnation (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)
- holding that de novo appellate review is required for constitutional challenges to punitive damages awards in part because institutional competence does not require deference to trial court

## Opinion text

Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment.
I was (and remain) of the view that excessive punitive damages do not violate the Due Process Clause; but the Court held otherwise. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U. S. 559 (1996); id., at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting). And I was of the view that we should review for abuse *444 of discretion (rather than de novo) fact-bound constitutional issues which, in their resistance to meaningful generalization, resemble the question of exeessiveness of punitive damages — namely, whether there exists reasonable suspicion for a stop and probable cause for a search; but the Court held otherwise. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996); id., at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Finally, in a case in which I joined a dissent that made it unnecessary for me to reach the issue, the Court categorically stated that "the question whether a fine is constitutionally excessive calls for ... de novo review.” United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U. S. 321, 336-387, n. 10 (1998); see id., at 344 (KENNEDY, J., joined by Rehnquist, C. J., and O’Connor and Scalia, JJ., dissenting). Given these precedents, I agree that de novo review of the question of excessive punitive damages best accords with our jurisprudence. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434072. Public record. Not legal advice.