# Illinois v. McArthur > Supreme Court of the United States · February 20, 2001 · 531 U.S. 326 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434040 ## Case - **Full name:** ILLINOIS v. McARTHUR - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** February 20, 2001 - **Citations:** 531 U.S. 326; 1 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 1442; 121 S. Ct. 946; 148 L. Ed. 2d 838; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 962 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Souter - **Judges:** Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Stevens - **Cited by:** 618 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434040 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - concluding where police officers had probable cause to believe home contained illegal drugs and reasonable concerns that, if unrestrained, homeowner would destroy drugs before officers could return with a warrant, officers did not violate Fourth Amendment by preventing homeown… - holding best, given that Smith saw no evidence of damage when she that police impoundment of residence that restrained entered the residence earlier in the day. Thus, it is clear that defendant from entering until warrant could be obtained was this case does not involve a “ris… - concluding that the impoundment and restriction on the suspect’s unaccompanied access to his home was reasonable, because it was “tailored to that need [to preserve evidence], being limited in time and scope, . . . and avoiding significant intrusion into the home itself” - holding that a seizure was not unreasonable where police officers, who had probable cause to believe a suspect had hidden marijuana in his home, prevented that suspect from entering his residence unaccompanied by an officer for two hours while a warrant was obtained - stating that the Court could find "no case in which [it] [had] held unlawful a temporary seizure that was supported by probable cause and was designed to prevent the loss of evidence while the police diligently obtained a warrant in a reasonable period of time" ## Opinion text Justice Souter, concurring. I join the Court’s opinion subject to this afterword on two points: the constitutionality of a greater intrusion than the one here and the permissibility of choosing impoundment over immediate search. Respondent McArthur’s location made the difference between the exigency that justified temporarily barring him from his own dwelling and circumstances that would have supported a greater interference with his privacy and property. As long as he was inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe that he had illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported and that with any sense he would flush them down the drain before the police could get a warrant to enter and search. This probability of destruction in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances exception to the general warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966). That risk would have justified the police in entering McArthur’s trailer promptly to make a lawful, warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967). When McArthur stepped *338 outside and left the trailer uninhabited, the risk abated and so did the reasonableness of entry by the police for as long as he was outside. This is so because the only justification claimed for warrantless action here is the immediate risk, and the limit of reasonable response by the police is set by the scope of the risk. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 25-26 (1968). Since, however, McArthur wished to go back in, why was it reasonable to keep him out when the police could perfectly well have let him do as he chose, and then enjoyed the ensuing opportunity to follow him and make a warrantless search justified by the renewed danger of destruction? The answer is not that the law officiously insists on safeguarding a suspect’s privacy from search, in preference to respecting the suspect’s liberty to enter his own dwelling. Instead, the legitimacy of the decision to impound the dwelling follows from the law’s strong preference for warrants, which underlies the rule that a search with a warrant has a stronger claim to justification on later, judicial review than a search without one. See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U. S. 102, 106 (1965); see also 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.2(b), p. 38 (3d ed. 1996) (“[M]ost states follow the rule which is utilized in the federal courts: if the search or seizure was pursuant to a warrant, the defendant has the burden of proof; but if the police acted without a warrant the burden of proof is on the prosecution”). The law can hardly raise incentives to obtain a warrant without giving the police a fair chance to take their probable cause to a magistrate and get one. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9434040. Public record. Not legal advice.