# Reno v. Bossier Parish School Board

> Supreme Court of the United States · January 24, 2000 · 528 U.S. 320

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433902

## Case

- **Full name:** Reno, Attorney General v. Bossier Parish School Board
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** January 24, 2000
- **Citations:** 528 U.S. 320; 120 S. Ct. 866; 145 L. Ed. 2d 845; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 993
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Scalia, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas, Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer
- **Cited by:** 116 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Questioned by Moore v. Detroit School Reform Board, 293 F.3d 352 (2002).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433902

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that even though the challenged apportionment plan would almost certainly be superseded by a new plan before the next election, the case nonetheless presented a live Article III case or controversy because the challenged plan "will serve as the baseline against which […
- holding that a claim for declaratory relief regarding electoral redistricting was not moot, despite the election having come and gone, because the existing plan would have probable continuing effect as a baseline for future redistricting plans
- explaining that “our holding today does not extend to violations consisting of an outright ‘denial’ of an individual’s right to vote, as opposed to an ‘abridgment’ as in dilution cases”
- stating that the VRA “bars certain types of voting tests and devices altogether”
- holding that Section 5 "does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan with a discriminatory but nonretrogressive purpose"

## Opinion text

*373 Justice Stevens,
with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
In its administration of the voting rights statute for the past quarter century, the Department of Justice has consistently employed a construction of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 contrary to that imposed upon the Act by the Court today. Apart from the deference such constructions are always afforded, the Department’s reading points us directly to the necessary starting point of any exercise in statutory interpretation — the plain language of the statute.
It is not impossible that language alone would lead one to think that the phrase “will not have the effect” includes some temporal measure; the noun “effect” and the verb tense “will have” could imaginably give rise to a reading that requires a comparison between what is and what will be. But there is simply nothing in the word “purpose” or the entire phrase “does not have the purpose” that would lead anyone to think that Congress had anything in mind but a present-tense, intentional effort to “den[y] or abridg[e] the right to vote on account of race.” See, e. g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1847 (1966). Ergo, if a municipality intends to deny or abridge voting rights because of race, it may not obtain preelearance.
Like Justice Souter, I am persuaded that the dissenting opinions of Justices White and Marshall were more faithful to the intent of the Congress that enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 than that of the majority in Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130 (1976). One need not, however, disavow that precedent in order to explain my profound disagreement with the Court’s holding today. The reading above makes clear that there is no necessary tension between the Beer majority’s interpretation of the word “effect” in § 5 and the Department’s consistent interpretation of the word “purpose.” For even if retrogression is an acceptable standard for identifying prohibited effects, that assumption does not justify an interpretation of the word *374 “purpose” that is at war with both controlling precedent and the plain meaning of the statutory text.
Accordingly, for these reasons and for those stated at greater length by Justice Souter, I respectfully dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433902. Public record. Not legal advice.