# Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District

> Supreme Court of the United States · January 24, 2000 · 528 U.S. 152

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433886

## Case

- **Full name:** Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** January 24, 2000
- **Citations:** 528 U.S. 152; 120 S. Ct. 684; 145 L. Ed. 2d 597; 2000 U.S. LEXIS 502
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Scalia
- **Judges:** Scalia, Stevens, Rehnquist, O'Connok, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Scaua
- **Cited by:** 765 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433886

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “the [Sixth] Amendment itself does not provide any basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal [or a right to appeal]” and holding “that neither the holding nor the reasoning in Faretta requires California to recognize a constitutional right to self…
- stating that “standby counsel may participate in the trial proceedings, even without the express consent of the defendant, as long as that participation does not seriously undermin[e] the appearance before the jury *301 that the defendant is representing himself’
- holding that the appellant had no constitutional right to represent himself on appeal and no right to a “hybrid” form of representation in which he would be represented by counsel while also acting simultaneously as his own counsel
- holding that because the Sixth Amendment does not include any right to appeal, it necessarily follows that the Sixth Amendment itself does not provide a basis for finding a right to self-representation on appeal
- stating that in “light of our conclusion that the Sixth Amendment does not apply to appellate proceedings, any individual right to self-representation on appeal . . . must be grounded in the Due Process Clause”

## Opinion text

Justice Scalia,
concurring in the judgment.
I do not share the apparent skepticism of today’s opinion concerning the judgment of the Court (often curiously described as merely the judgment of “the majority”) in Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). I have no doubt that the Framers of our Constitution, who were suspicious enough of governmental power — including judicial power — that they insisted upon a citizen’s right to be judged by an independent jury of private citizens, would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment of counsel by the government to plead a criminal defendant’s case. While I might have rested the decision upon the Due Process Clause rather than the Sixth Amendment, I believe it was correct.
That asserting the right of self-representation may often, or even usually, work to the defendant’s disadvantage is no more remarkable — and no more a basis for withdrawing the right — than is the fact that proceeding without counsel in custodial interrogation, or confessing to the crime, usually works to the defendant’s disadvantage. Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is unworthy of a free people. As Justice Frankfurter eloquently put it for the Court in Adams v. United States ex rel McCann, 317 U. S. 269 (1942), to require the acceptance of counsel “is to imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution.” Id., at 280 .
In any event, Faretta is relevant to the question before us only to the limited extent that we must decide whether its holding applies to self-representation on appeal. It seems to me that question is readily answered by the fact that there is no constitutional right to appeal. See McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684, 687-688 (1894). Since a State could, as *166 far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, subject its trial-court determinations to no review whatever, it could a fortiori subject them to review which consists of a nonad-versarial reexamination of convictions by a panel of government experts. Adversarial review with counsel appointed by the State is even less questionable than that.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433886. Public record. Not legal advice.