# Olmstead v. L.C. > Supreme Court of the United States · June 22, 1999 · 527 U.S. 581 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433861 ## Case - **Full name:** OLMSTEAD, COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES, Et Al. v. L.C., by Zimring, Guardian Ad Litem and Next Friend, Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States - **Decided:** June 22, 1999 - **Citations:** 527 U.S. 581; 12 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 424; 1999 Colo. J. C.A.R. 3627; 99 Daily Journal DAR 6263; 9 Am. Disabilities Cas. (BNA) 705; 67 U.S.L.W. 4567; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4859; 119 S. Ct. 2176; 144 L. Ed. 2d 540; 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4368 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens - **Judges:** Ginsburg, Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Breyer, Sotjter, Kennedy, Thomas, Rehnquist, Scaxia - **Cited by:** 681 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433861 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the "unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination," because of, among other factors, the "[d]issimilar treatment" inherent in the fact that institutionalized isolation requires persons with disabilities to "relinquis… - finding that the “unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of discrimination,” because the dissimilar treatment inherent to institutionalization requires persons with disabilities to “relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy… - explaining that such a limited focus “overlooks costs the State cannot avoid; most notably, a ‘State . . . may experience increased overall expenses by funding community placements without being able to take advantage of the savings associated with the closure of institutions’… - holding that unnecessary institutional segregation of persons with mental disabilities was discriminatory as it required “persons with mental disabilities . . . [to] relinquish participation in community life they could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons with… - recognizing that “the State generally may rely on the reasonable assessments of its own professionals in determining whether an individual” meets the requirements to live in a community setting and that, “[a]bsent such qualification, it would be inappropriate to remove a patie… ## Opinion text Justice Stevens, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Unjustified disparate treatment, in this case, “unjustified institutional isolation,” constitutes discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. See ante, at 600. If a plaintiff requests relief that requires modification of a State’s services or programs, the State may assert, as an affirmative defense, that the requested modification would cause a fundamental alteration of a State’s services and programs. In this case, the Court of Appeals appropriately remanded for consideration of the State’s affirmative defense. On remand, the District Court rejected the State’s “fundamental-alteration defense.” See ante, at 596, n. 7. If the District Court was wrong in concluding that costs unrelated to the treatment of L. C. and E. W. do not support such a defense in this ease, that arguable error should be corrected either by the Court of Appeals or by this Court in review of that decision. In my opinion, therefore, we should simply affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. *608 But because there are not five votes for that disposition, I join the Court’s judgment and Parts I, II, and III-A of its opinion. Cf. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 655-656 (1998) (Stevens, J., concurring); Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91, 134 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring in result). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433861. Public record. Not legal advice.