# O'Sullivan v. Boerckel

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 7, 1999 · 526 U.S. 838

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433813

## Case

- **Full name:** O’sullivan v. Boerckel
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 7, 1999
- **Citations:** 526 U.S. 838; 119 S. Ct. 1728; 144 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1999 U.S. LEXIS 4003
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Souter
- **Judges:** O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer
- **Cited by:** 6,987 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433813

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that “[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, . . . state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportun…
- stating that “[b]Jecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, . . . state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportu…
- stating that “[b]ecause the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those claims are presented to the federal courts, . . . state prisoners must give the state courts one full opportun…
- explaining that to prevent habeas litigants from evading the statutory requirement that they exhaust administrative remedies, the Court has developed the doctrine of procedural default, which asks “not only whether a prisoner has exhausted his state remedies, but also whether …
- finding that “[a]lthough [the language of § 2254] could be read to effectively foreclose habeas review by requiring a state prisoner to invoke any possible avenue of state court review, we have never interpreted the exhaustion requirement in such a restrictive fashion” and “we…

## Opinion text

Justice Souter,
concurring.
I agree with the Court’s strict holding that “the creation of a discretionary review system does not, without more, make review in the Illinois Supreme Court unavailable” for purposes of federal habeas exhaustion. Ante, at 848. I understand the Court to have left open the question (not directly implicated by this case) whether we should construe the exhaustion doctrine to force a State, in effect, to rule on discretionary review applications when the State has made it plain that it does not wish to require such applications before its petitioners may seek federal habeas relief. The Supreme Court of South Carolina, for example, has declared:
“[I]n all appeals from criminal convictions or post-conviction relief matters, a litigant shall not be required to petition for rehearing and certiorari following an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals in order to be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies respecting a claim of error. Rather, when the claim has been presented to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, and relief has been denied, the litigant shall be deemed to have exhausted all available state remedies.” In re Exhaustion of State Remedies in Criminal and Post-Conviction Relief Cases, 321 S. C. 563, 564, 471 S. E. 2d 454 (1990).
The Court is clear that “nothing in the exhaustion doctrine requires] federal courts to ignore a state law or rule providing that a given procedure is not available.” Ante, at 847-848. Its citation of In re Exhaustion of State Remedies, for the proposition that the increased burden on state courts may be unwelcome, should not be read to suggest something more: that however plainly a State may speak its *850 highest court must be subjected to constant applications for a form of discretionary review that the State wishes to reserve for truly extraordinary eases, or else be forced to eliminate that kind of discretionary review.
In construing the exhaustion requirement, . .. held that state prisoners do not have to invoke extraordinary remedies when those remedies are alternatives to the standard review process and where the state courts have not provided relief through those remedies in the past.” Ante, at 844 (citing Wilwordmg v. Swenson, 404 U. S. 249, 249-250 (1971) (per curiam)). I understand that we leave open the possibility that a state prisoner is likewise free to skip a procedure even when a state court has occasionally employed it to provide relief, so long as the State has identified the procedure as outside the standard review process and has plainly said that it need not be sought for the purpose of exhaustion. It is not obvious that either comity or precedent requires otherwise.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433813. Public record. Not legal advice.
