# Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael

> Supreme Court of the United States · March 23, 1999 · 526 U.S. 137

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433767

## Case

- **Full name:** KUMHO TIRE CO., LTD., Et Al. v. CARMICHAEL Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** March 23, 1999
- **Citations:** 526 U.S. 137; 119 S. Ct. 1167; 143 L. Ed. 2d 238; 1999 U.S. LEXIS 2189
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Stevens
- **Judges:** Breyer, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scaua, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Scalia, Stevens
- **Cited by:** 8,412 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433767

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that a trial court may consider the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993
- holding that whether the area of expertise of a proffered expert witness is technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or …
- holding that whether the witness’ area of expertise was technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience,…
- holding that whether the witness’ area of expertise is technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the district court, in its “gatekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, …
- holding that whether the witness’s area of expertise was technical, scientific, or more generally “experience-based,” the court, in its “ga-tekeeping” function, must “make certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employ…

## Opinion text

Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The only question that we granted certiorari to decide is whether a trial judge “[m]ay... consider the four factors set out by this Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U. S. 579 (1993), in a Rule 702 analysis of admissibility of an engineering expert’s testimony.” Pet. for Cert. i. That question is fully and correctly answered in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion, which I join.
question whether the trial judge abused his discretion when he excluded the testimony of Dennis Carlson. Because a proper answer to that question requires a study of the record that can be performed more efficiently by the Court of Appeals than by the nine Members of this Court, I would remand the case to the Eleventh Circuit to perform that task. There are, of course, exceptions to most rules, but I firmly believe that it is neither fair to litigants nor good practice for this Court to reach out to decide questions not raised by the certiorari petition. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U. S. 136, 150-151 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
while I do not feel qualified to disagree with the well-reasoned factual analysis in Part III of the Gourt’s opinion, I do not join that Part, and I respectfully dissent from the Court’s disposition of the case.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433767. Public record. Not legal advice.