# Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott

> Supreme Court of the United States · June 25, 1998 · 524 U.S. 357

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433686

## Case

- **Full name:** Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v. Scott
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** June 25, 1998
- **Citations:** 524 U.S. 357; 118 S. Ct. 2014; 141 L. Ed. 2d 344; 1998 U.S. LEXIS 4037
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, Breyer
- **Cited by:** 475 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433686

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that “the rule does not ‘proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons,’ . . . but applies only in contexts ‘where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served[.]’” (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.…
- finding that application of exclusionary rule would significantly alter traditionally flexible and informal administrative procedures of parole revocation because exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation that is inconsistent with nonadversarial, administrativ…
- holding that the federal exclusionary rule does not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials and does not bar the introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights
- concluding that the application of the exclusionary rule to parole revocation proceedings would have a minimal deterrent effect on police officers, whose zone of primary interest was “obtaining convictions of those who commit crimes”
- holding that federal exclusionary rule does not extend to proceedings other than criminal trials and does not bar introduction at parole revocation hearings of evidence seized in violation of parolees’ Fourth Amendment rights

## Opinion text

Justice Stevens,
dissenting.
Justice Souter has explained why the deterrent function of the exclusionary rule is implicated as much by a parole revocation proceeding as by a conventional criminal trial. I agree with that explanation. I add this comment merely to endorse Justice Stewart’s conclusion that the “rule is constitutionally required, not as a ‘right’ explicitly incorporated in the fourth amendment’s prohibitions, but as a remedy necessary to ensure that those prohibitions are observed in fact.” *370 Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1865 , 1389 (1983). See also Arizona v. Evans, 514 U. S. 1, 18-19 , and n. 1 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Segura v. United States, 468 U. S. 796, 828 , and n. 22 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 978 , and n. 37 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433686. Public record. Not legal advice.