# Lynce v. Mathis

> Supreme Court of the United States · February 19, 1997 · 519 U.S. 433

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433422

## Case

- **Full name:** LYNCE v. MATHIS, SUPERINTENDENT, TOMOKA CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Et Al.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** February 19, 1997
- **Citations:** 519 U.S. 433; 117 S. Ct. 891; 137 L. Ed. 2d 63; 1997 U.S. LEXIS 1269; 1997 WL 65582
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Thomas
- **Judges:** Stevens, Thomas, Scalia
- **Cited by:** 660 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Yellow flag:** Reported overruled — as noted by 2 later courts — not on the Supreme Court's list.
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 2
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433422

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that in "post- Weaver cases, [the Court has] . . . considered whether the legislature's action lengthened the sentence without examining the purposes behind the original sentencing scheme," and noting that in Miller, the Court's conclusion that the sentencing guidel…
- explaining that in "post-Weacer cases, [the Court has] . . . considered whether the legislature's action lengthened the sentence without examining the purposes behind the original sentencing scheme," and noting that in Miller, the Court's conclusion that the sentencing guideli…
- stating that because petitioner was awarded 1,860 provisional credits which were retroactively canceled as a result of a 1992 amendment, the 1992 amendment “has unquestionably disadvantaged petitioner because it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged his imprisonment” and amou…
- holding that “exhaustion would have been futile” because the Florida Supreme Court previously rejected the same claim in other cases and counsel for the state had “not suggested any reason why the Florida courts would have decided petitioner’s case differently.”
- finding an ex post facto violation where Florida rearrested an inmate and returned him to custody after retroactively canceling "provisional credits" that had been credited towards the inmate's sentence and resulted in his release from custody

## Opinion text

Justice Thomas,
with whom Justice Scalia joins,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I understand the Court’s opinion to hold that retroactively canceling petitioner’s so-called “provisional credits” after he has used them to gain his freedom violates the Ex Post Facto Clause. This result naturally follows from our consistent view that the Clause is intended to prohibit laws that “retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punish *450 ment for criminal acts.” Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U. S. 37, 43 (1990).
Whether a particular law retroactively increases a criminal punishment is often a close question. In California Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U. S. 499 (1995), for example, respondent challenged a retroactive change to the frequency of parole hearings. Given that the retroactive change “create[d] only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes,” we found no ex post facto violation. Id., at 514 .
Unlike in Morales , the increase in petitioner’s punishment here was neither “speculative” nor “attenuated.” Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and was duly sentenced. During the period of his confinement, petitioner accumulated release credits under a state statute adopted in response to prison overcrowding. Those credits enabled petitioner to be freed from prison before his sentence (as originally imposed) had run. Shortly before petitioner secured his release, however, the Florida Legislature enacted a statute preventing certain categories of offenders from taking advantage of the provisional credits. Although petitioner’s offense placed him among the offenders denied the opportunity to acquire those particular credits, the statute was not applied retroactively. Petitioner was thus released. The state attorney general subsequently issued an opinion giving the statute retroactive effect. The State thereafter rearrested petitioner and returned him to custody.
Under these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the State’s retroactive nullification of petitioner’s previously accrued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution’s ban on ex post facto lawmaking. I do not, however, join the majority’s discussion of Weaver v. Graham, 450 U. S. 24 (1981), which I find unnecessary to the resolution of this case. In Weaver , we considered whether a statute *451 that merely altered the availability of “good conduct” credits ran afoul of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id., at 25 . The present case involves not merely an effect on the availability of future release credits, but the retroactive elimination of credits already earned and used. Accordingly, I concur in part and concur in the judgment.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9433422. Public record. Not legal advice.